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"perfection is admirable but a trifle inhuman..
I. INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Liberty and equality probably make up the essence of Ameri-
can constitutional principle.2 These central aspirations of our con-
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1 Roger Angell, The Summer Game 41 (1972) (describing the attitude of a New York
Mets fan toward the New York Yankees in 1962).
2 The opinions of the Supreme Court illuminate their centrality. The realm of liberty
encompasses first amendment ideals of free speech, thought, and conscience. See, e.g.,
Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (1970); Philip B. Kurland, Reli-
gion and the Law (1962). It also embraces procedural due process rules that circumscribe
governmental power to confine and constrain, see, e.g., Jerold Israel, Selective Incorporation:
Revisited, 71 Geo. L. J. 253 (1982), and substantive due process notions that eliminate gov-
ernmental regulation from certain discrete areas, see, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 5
(1978); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L. J. 624 (1980).
Equality appears most prominently in the jurisprudence of the equal protection clause.
See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1972); Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
Colum. L. Rev. 1023 (1979).
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stitutional faith often coexist in conflict.3 Theory does not demand
this tension;" but unfortunate realities inject a degree of enmity
between these ideals. One of these realities is prejudice, such as
racism or sexism. For example, achieving some measure of racial
equality in a segregated society has necessitated the impositions on
liberty brought about by the remedy of forced busing.5 A second
sobering condition that pits liberty against equality is disparate
wealth.' For example, the liberty to speak has been construed to
allow richer candidates for office the right to outspend poorer
ones.
7
A third harsh reality that may exacerbate this tension is une-
qual natural ability. By natural ability I mean the sum of one's
talents, including intelligence and capacity for hard work.8 This
3 Not only does the interplay between these values spark controversy, but so does de-
fining the content of each. For example, University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), revealed a deep rift in the Court regarding what sort of classifications offend
equal protection. Compare id. at 287-99 with id. at 356-62 (Brennan, J., concurring). The
concept of liberty can be similarly hard to define with precision. In McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961), and Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the Court struggled to
choose between transgressing the freedom of conscience of the majority who worshiped on
Sundays and that of the minority who did not. The decisions, upholding Sunday closing
laws against an establishment clause challenge in McGowan and a free exercise challenge in
Braunfield, illustrated a certain indeterminance as to what counts as religious liberty.
4 Liberty and equality should sustain each other. Equal political power is less condu-
cive to domination than is oligarchy; this suggests that equality nurtures liberty. Adam
Smith noted that the absence of concentrated economic power favors economic liberty.
Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 83-84, 363-64, 471-72, 497-98, 529 (R. L. Meek, D.
D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein eds. 1978); Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 278 (Edwin
Cannon ed. 1976). See also Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 72 (1981) (depre-
cating monopoly power).
1 See generally Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 247-52
(1973) (Powell, J., dissenting). In constitutional jurisprudence, combatting racism generally
has resulted in equality infringing on liberty. In Bob Jones University v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983), racial equality exacted a heavy toll on religious liberty. The Court upheld
the government's denial of tax exempt status to a denominational university that proscribed
interracial dating or marriage by students because sponsors of the University "genuinely
believe[d] that the Bible forbids [those practices]." Id. at 580. In Roberts v. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984), the Court allowed a demand for gender equality to infringe on freedom of
association, upholding a Minnesota law compelling the all-male Jaycees to admit women.
' Claims of political liberty often have exacerbated preexisting economic inequality. In
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Court extended the right
of free speech to corporations. Libertarian claims of corporate speech thus superseded indi-
vidual contentions of unequal ability to speak. See generally id. at 788-92 (majority opin-
ion), 809-12 (White, J., dissenting). See also Jerome Barron, Access to the Press-A New
First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967) (libertarian interests undergirding a
free press clash with competing egalitarian claims of access to the media).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Buckley Court struck down
that part of the Federal Election Campaign Act that limited the amount a candidate could
spend on his own campaign.
8 Consider John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 74 (1971), in which Rawls maintains that
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condition, which is partly a quirk of fate,9 figures heavily-along
with fortune and risk taking-in determining the distribution of
resources within society.10 Government itself routinely distributes
valuable resources-such as jobs and education-based on natural
ability.11
Counting ability as a property right, a libertarian might argue
that government should not be empowered to regulate it. In the
constitutional context, Lochner v. New York1 2 and its progeny en-
dorsed the assertion that labor, which partly manifests ability,
should be enveloped in constitutional protection. The subsequent
acceptance (by a judiciary under intense political pressure13) of ex-
tensive regulation of economic enterprise represented an egalita-
rian incursion on individual freedom to exploit one's natural abili-
ties. 1 4  The constitutional amendment permitting taxation of
income represented another egalitarian constraint on liberty.15
Thus, egalitarian concerns have substantially contracted the pro-
distributions according to effort are morally capricious because the ability to exert effort is
arbitrarily distributed. Individuals may still have some claim to their exertion of effort on
the ground that to deny them any such claim would amount to involuntary servitude. Soci-
ety. might also recognize such claims, on utilitarian grounds, to give incentives' to exert
effort.
9 See id. at 15, 103-04.
10 See President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behaviorial Research, Splicing Life: A Report of the Social and Ethical Issues
of Genetic Engineering with Human Beings 67-68 (1982) ("President's Commission");
Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 93 (cited in note 8) (listing intelligence, wealth, and opportu-
nity as primary social goods that allow persons to attain their personal goals); Michael Sha-
piro, Who Merits Merit? Problems in Distributive Justice and Utility Posed by the New
Biology, 48 So. Cal. L. Rev. 318, 347 (1974); Note, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure
for Mediocrity?, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1850, 1862 n.59 (1981). The Supreme Court does not
shield people from a distributive standard based on natural ability. See generally Note,
Equal Protection and Intelligence Classifications, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 647 (1974). The primary
attempt that society makes to redress superior ability that results in superior wealth is to
tax income and inheritance progressively. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-1564, 2001-09 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
" The Constitution helps to underwrite the economic value of differential ability by
protecting private property, even when it is acquired as a result of differential ability. See,
e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (proscribing governmental takings of property without just
compensation).
12 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13 See Robert Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy (1941); Merto Pussey, The
Supreme Court Crisis (1937).
"' In this connection, obvious distributive effects emanated from labor decisions up-
holding statutes which enforce minimum wages, maximum hours, and collective bargaining.
See generally United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937).
15 U.S. Const. amend. XVI. The sixteenth amendment was necessitated by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., which held the Income Tax
Act of 1894 unconstitutional. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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tective ring of individual liberty. A more circumscribed sphere re-
mains that includes freedom of thought, belief, and expression;
freedom from arbitrary search, seizure, confinement, or punish-
ment; and freedom in childbearing,"8 child rearing,17 and certain
other familial matters.'8
A. Human Genetic Engineering: The Genos Scenario
Suppose government intruded on the personal sphere to regu-
late for egalitarian ends the distribution of abilities, that is, the
"constitution" of the human being itself. Such is the prospect
presented by positive genetic engineering, 19 which seeks to aug-
ment the biological capabilities of human beings. To focus the in-
quiry, the following scenario pits egalitarian interests in race,
wealth, and ability against libertarian interests in childbearing and
child rearing.
11 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); id. at 168-70 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
17 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (right of parents to
send children to private schools).
18 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (striking down
zoning ordinance prohibiting "extended family" from living together in single dwelling unit).
19 The term "genetic engineering" has been used in both a narrow and a broad sense.
Narrowly, it refers to a "wide range of techniques by which scientists can add genetically
determined characteristics to cells which would not otherwise have possessed them." Presi-
dent's Commission at 8 (cited in note 10). One such technique utilizes deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA), which encodes and passes on genetic characteristics. Since DNA's discovery in 1953,
scientists have learned how to isolate a specific DNA sequence from one species or organism
and transfer it to a second species or organism to alter that second species or organism. This
process is called "recombinant DNA." Id. at 9. A related technique involves cell fusion,
which brings together genetic material from two cells to produce a hybrid that can
reproduce. Id.
In a broader sense, genetic engineering may refer to selective breeding, in vitro fertiliza-
tion, cloning, and even the practice of medicine. Id. Although the specific hypothetical situa-
tion that this article addresses primarily involves genetic engineering in the narrow sense, I
also use the term more broadly to encompass any purposeful alteration of an organism's
genetic composition. In addition to recombinant DNA and cell fusion, this definition would
include cloning, breeding superior traits, in vitro fertilization when used in breeding, and
sterilization to alter the genetic composition of the species. The definition would exclude in
vitro fertilization used to assist a woman with blocked fallopian tubes. Id. at 9. It would also
exclude the ordinary practice of medicine that happens to change the genetic characteristics
of the human race by allowing those who have life-threatening genetic deformities to survive
and reproduce those deformities. Id. at 8.
Genetic engineering often is classified as negative or positive. The negative sort reduces
or eliminates deleterious genes while the positive type encourages desirable or superior
traits. See generally Louis van Loon, A Buddhist Perspective, in G. Oosthuizen, H. Shapiro,
and S. Strauss, eds., Genetics and Society 148, 154-55 (1980). Of course, the two categories
overlap. Id. at 155. Although parts of this article treat problems in negative genetic engi-
neering, the focus is on the positive sort.
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Suppose a drug company discovers a new drug, Genos,20 which
can be used to develop stronger, more intelligent human beings.
The method of using the drug involves a series of complex surgical
procedures. Researchers begin by extracting an egg from a woman
and fertilizing it in vitro. They proceed through micro-injection to
manipulate pharmacologically the genetic structure of the fertil-
ized egg. The egg is then inserted back into the womb where it
develops until the woman gives birth.
Suppose the drug company has performed these operations, on
an experimental basis, on human beings of various racial and eth-
nic extractions, in various environmental conditions. Subjects of
the Genos experiments have been many times stronger-in both
strength and stamina-than average human beings of their sex,
and have had IQs2' well above genius level. Although the drug
helps to foster societal standards of beauty, its human subjects
have also exhibited several physical characteristics that make them
easily recognizable.22 Otherwise, it is undisputed that the drug is
completely safe to use and poses no undesirable side effects to the
mother or to the resulting fetus23 or child at any stage of
development.24
Finally, suppose scarcity of the raw materials necessary to
manufacture the drug will limit Genos births to approximately
15,000 per year. Based on natural scarcity, high production costs,
and high surgical costs, the drug company estimates that the price
of having a Genos child will be $170,000.25 The paucity of raw
materials needed to produce Genos will increase the price of "the
drug for the foreseeable future. Under pressure from citizens who
cannot afford the drug, Congress considers the policy merits and
constitutionality of a ban on the manufacture of Genos.26
20 "Genos" is a Greek word that means "birth, race, kind, stock, genus." 4 Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary 123 (1933). See also Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, eds., A Greek-
English Lexicon 344 (1940).
21 1 use IQ simply to indicate that the drug dramatically increases intelligence, however
measured.
22 Some genetic techniques, like the use of growth hormone, produce distinctive physi-
cal characteristics. See sources cited in note 38 below.
22 Throughout this article, I will use "fetus" to refer to all stages of prenatal develop-
ment from the fertilized egg forward. This usage is partly for simplicity and partly because
genetic engineering might take place at various stages of prenatal development.
24 The projection does not consider safety risks, as these are specific to individual ge-
netic technologies.
25 Genos would generate difficult issues even if it were not expensive. See note 272
below.
2. The regulation of Genos controls morality and lifestyle, areas traditionally covered
by the regulation regimes of the states. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824).
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Is this situation wildly improbable? Science is not yet capable
of genetic engineering on the scale described in the above scenario,
which is unabashedly futuristic for two reasons. First, it is hard to
know exactly how far science has progressed. The furious pace of
experimentation is geometrically expanding our understanding of
genetic processes. Moreover, strong incentives exist to keep ad-
vances secret: much genetic research is controversial, 7 and often
the maintenance of trade secrets is all that protects financial bo-
nanzas. 28 In this milieu, focusing on the present state of knowledge
renders legal analysis obsolete as soon as pen is put to paper. Al-
ternatively, waiting to discuss regulation until these technologies
are operational is pointless: by that time events will dictate legal
rules.
Somewhat paradoxically, the second reason the scenario is fu-
turistic is that, by traveling far beyond known scientific capabili-
ties, it provides a starting point for analysis. The only feasible
method of considering policy options may be to anticipate the
eventual results of current research.29 By focusing on an extreme
Thus, in order to fall within Congress's regulatory ambit, controls on the drug might need to
be characterized as regulations of commerce. Current judicial constructions of the commerce
power are certainly broad enough to permit Congress to claim that Genos has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 756-58 (1982)
(applying test of whether there is "rational basis" to connect regulation with interstate com-
merce); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 246-48 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (upholding
prohibition on age discrimination as within commerce power); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (upholding prohibition on discrimination in accommodations as within
commerce power). Nor would regulation-even proscription-violate the economic rights of
the drug's vendors under the due process or equal protection clauses. See, e.g., Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955). Products like Genos illustrate how fundamen-
tally economic regulations can affect personal liberty, as the Court conceives of it. Genos
further blurs the line between congressional regulation of economic liberty and court protec-
tion of personal liberty.
27 See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Release of a Gene-Altered Agent Violated Policy, E.P.A.
Charges, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at B28, col. 1 (release of first genetically engineered
organisms into the atmosphere performed without public or governmental knowledge).
'" The United States Department of Commerce recently estimated that the worldwide
market for genetically engineered drugs alone could reach $100 billion per year by the year
2000. Peter Osterfund, Challenges to U.S. Lead in Biotech, Christian Science Monitor, Jan.
24, 1985, at 14, coI. 1.
" The New York Times called human genetic engineering "a watershed in history, per-
haps in evolution" and urged that debate concerning these technologies begin now. Whether
to Make Perfect Humans, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1982, at A22, col. 1. Senator Albert Gore,
who chaired the recent congressional committee on human genetic engineering, urged that
society begin to establish guidelines now because "the technology to perform gene therapy
may be upon us sooner than originally imagined." Albert Gore and Steve Owens, The Chal-
lenge of Biotechnology, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 336, 354 (1985). Senator Gore continued:
The first gene therapy experiments could occur within a year. Although these experi-
ments will entail only an elementary application of the technology, they represent the
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form of positive human genetic engineering, we can ponder
whether government can or should prohibit any safe forms of posi-
tive genetic manipulation. 0 The basic inquiry lays a foundation
upon which to build future analyses addressing specific technolo-
gies. To merit serious consideration, however, our scenario must
have some basis in reality.
In this connection, several technologies lend credibility to the
prospects of something like Genos. Perhaps the simplest technol-
ogy that might be used to develop genetically superior traits com-
bines artificial insemination with heredity. The number of children
born who are conceived by artificial insemination now exceeds
20,000 per year.3' Sperm donors can be selected for genetically at-
tractive traits. Indeed, one wealthy eugenicist has embarked on a
program of genius sperm banks: the sperm of Nobel Laureates and
other highly intelligent individuals have been used artificially to
inseminate recipients who are also selected for their high intelli-
gence.2 In vitro fertilization techniques expand the possibilities by
permitting eggs to be removed from women with particularly high
intelligence or other desired traits.33 After the egg is fertilized in
vitro by the sperm of a donor with desirable traits, the resultant
embryo may be inserted into a womb donor and sold 34  or
"donated" at birth-or perhaps while still in the womb.3 5 In vitro
first step on a journey to an unknown destination. The earlier in the journey that soci-
ety develops guidelines for dealing with gene therapy, the smoother the trip will be.
Id. at 354-55.
30 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must approve all drugs in interstate com-
merce for safety and efficacy. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 355 (1982). See Wallace Janssen, The
U.S. Food and Drug Law: How It Came About; How It Works, 35 Food Drug Cosmetic L. J.
132, 137-38 (1980).
31 Note, Genesis Retold: Legal Issues Raised by the Cryopreservation of Preimplanta-
tion Human Embryos, 36 Syracuse L. Rev. 1021, 1022 (1985).
" Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1850 & nn. 4-5 (cited in note 10). Beyond potential appli-
cation of laws against adultery and fornication, the practice of artificial insemination is now
virtually unrestricted. Kathryn Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory
for Legislation, 44 La. L. Rev. 1641, 1645-53 (1984); Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1855 (cited in
note 10); Comment, The Need for Regulation of Artificial Insemination by Donor, 22 San
Diego L. Rev. 1193, 1196 (1985).
'3 The federal government has studied the implications of in vitro fertilization. Ethics
Advisory Board Report and Conclusions: New Support of Research Involving In Vitro Fer-
tilization and Embryo Transfer, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,041 (1979).
" However, many states forbid commercial trafficking in babies. See Lorio, 44 La. L.
Rev. at 1657-58 (cited in note 32). Definitional issues would be crucial to the legality of the
sale of an embryo or fetus. For a discussion of embryo transactions as they relate to procrea-
tive liberty, see John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 So. Cal. L. Rev. 939, 1018-21 (1986).
35 Critics may doubt the effectiveness of these techniques and point out that intelli-
gence and other desirable traits are determined by environment as well as by heredity.
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fertilization alone is expensive. Several attempts are normally re-
quired, and costs can vary from $5,000 to $25,000.36 Sperm or eggs
from persons with desired traits could also fetch considerable
SUMS.
Beyond the use of heredity, science currently has pharmaco-
logical and other means of fostering superior traits. Certain drugs
may be able significantly to increase memory and IQ.3 7 Growth
hormone, which has been used to augment the stature of dwarfs,
can stretch size and potential immediate strength.3 8 Technology
can also manipulate stamina. For example, scientists have im-
planted electrodes into the brain that might be used to generate
desired responses to effect attitudinal changes such as increased
productivity."
Further, abortion may be used to foster desirable genetic
traits. Although there is no necessary link between genetic charac-
teristics and abortion, amniocentesis and other technologies enable
doctors to examine the genetic makeup of the fetus. Current capa-
bilities largely are confined to the realm of negative genetic engi-
neering, that is, to spotting and aborting fetuses with genetic de-
fects. But it may also be possible to foster desired traits: parents
Many studies, however, indicate that the influence of heredity on intelligence may be fairly
significant. See Sandra Scarr and Louise Carter-Saltzman, Genetics and Intelligence, in
John Fuller and Edward Simmel, eds., Behavior Genetics 217, 264-76, 317-18 (1983). See
also Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1856 n.34 (cited in note 10) (citing studies that also highly
correlate intelligence with heredity). To the extent that intelligence is influenced by envi-
ronment, it can also be controlled. Parenthetically, several studies indicate that grossly dis-
advantageous environments together with cultural biases in intelligence tests discount the
strength of this heredity-intelligence correlation in the case of black persons. Sandra Scarr
and Louis Carter-Saltzman, Genetics and Intelligence, in John Fuller and Edward Simmel,
eds., Behavior Genetics at 300 (1983).
36 William J. Winslade and Judith Wilson Ross, High-Tech Babies: A Growth Industry,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1986, at A31, col. 2.
37 Shapiro, 48 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 319 n.1 (cited in note 10). One technique involves
pharmacologically increasing the supply of RNA, which is DNA's genetic messenger and also
governs cell metabolism. Roderic Gorney, The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 273, 350 (1968).
Indeed, the growth hormone can now be synthetically produced using recombinant
DNA techniques. Stuart L. Nightingale, Emerging Technologies and FDA Policy Formula-
tion: The Impact of Government Regulation on Developing Drugs from New Technologies,
37 Food Drug Cosmetic L. J. 212, 215 (1982). Widespread use of the hormone remains cir-
cumscribed because it causes undesirable disproportions in body parts. Human Genetic En-
gineering: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1982) (testimony of Zsolt Har-
sanyi, Vice-President, DNA Sciences, E. F. Hutton) ("Hearings").
39 Gorney, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 338-41 (cited in note 37). See also John Batt, They
Shoot Horses, Don't They?: An Essay on the Scotoma of One-Eyed Kings, 15 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 510, 523-25 (1968).
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already may determine their child's gender.40 As the prognostic vi-
sion of science grows more acute, technology will permit fertilizing
several eggs at a time in vitro and then aborting all but the most
desirable embryo.
On the horizon lie the techniques of cloning and gene splicing,
by which one can replicate or rearrange the genetic structure of a
particular individual. Cloning is a technology capable of producing
an offspring that is an exact genetic likeness of the parent organ-
ism. Generally speaking, the nucleus of the cell or th6 organism
that is to be replicated is substituted for the nucleus of an egg
cell.41 Although the process has never been performed successfully
on humans, frogs were first cloned over a decade ago,42 and mice
have been duplicated by similar methods.43 Applied to people,
cloning could develop superior genetic traits by copying human be-
ings who have them. Alternatively, selective mating could breed
"model human beings" to clone.
Perhaps the most far-reaching genetic technology is gene splic-
ing, or recombinant DNA. The genetic structure of the cell resem-
bles a chain of genes. Recombinant-DNA technologies splice that
chain to rearrange it or substitute new genetic matter in order to
alter the genetic composition of the cell.44 These technologies al-
ready have myriad commercial and medical applications, primarily
involving plants and microorganisms. 4'5 The state of the art has
progressed far beyond this stage, however-perhaps to the creation
of a new "superspecies" of animals.46
40 See Note, Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis of the Abortion Liberty
and a Person's Right to Know, 56 Ind. L. J. 281, 283-84 (1981) (arguing that the legislature
can constitutionally proscribe discriminatory abortion for gender selection).
41 Environmental differences will cause parent and clone to be less than exactly identi-
cal. See George Huddock, Gene Therapy and Genetic Engineering: Frankenstein Is Still a
Myth, But It Should Be Reread Periodically, 48 Ind. L. J. 533, 555-56 (1973).
42 Clifford Grobstein, From Chance to Purpose: An Appraisal of External Human Fer-
tilization 126 (1981).
43 The techniques that have been used to clone mice are somewhat different from those
used to clone frogs. Cloning has also produced identical calf twins. See Burke Zimmerman,
Biofuture 270-71 (1984).
44 See note 19 above.
45 Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Cong., Commercial Biotechnology: An Inter-
national Analysis (1984); President's Commission at 9, 36-38 (cited in note 10); Edward
Korwek, FDA Regulation of Biotechnology as a New Method of Manufacture, 37 Food Drug
Cosmetic L. J. 289, 291-92 (1982); Thomas McGarity and Karl Bayer, Federal Regulation of
Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 461, 465 (1983).
4" An important breakthrough was the creation of "supermice" in 1982 through the
injection of rat growth genes into mouse embryos, producing mice roughly twice normal size.
See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Williams, Mouse and Supermouse, 300 Nature 575 (1982); Jon W.
Gordon and Frank H. Ruddle, Gene Transfer into Mouse Embryos: Production of Trans-
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Genetic structure plays some role in influencing virtually every
aspect of human development, including such traits as body
weight, height, hair color, eye color, intelligence, disease resistance,
and perhaps even personality and longevity.47 But applying recom-
binant-DNA technologies to engender positive traits in human be-
ings seems beyond our grasp for the present. Particularly difficult
will be influencing the complex, polygenic trait of intelligence. 8
Still, in recent congressional hearings, several prominent physi-
cians cautioned that society now should begin pondering even this
technological advancement.49 In vitro fertilization now allows the
manipulation of the egg and young embryo outside the womb. °
Scientists already have developed systems by which they have suc-
cessfully injected new genetic material into cells.51 By the end of
genic Mice by Pronuclear Injection, 101 Methods in Enzymology 411 (1983). Essentially, a
new species was born. Supermice have also been fabricated using synthesized human growth
hormone genes. See generally Maxine Singer, Genetics and the Law: A Scientist's View, 3
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 315, 330 (1985). Recently, the United States Department of Agriculture
funded attempts to create "supersheep" and "superpigs." One of the researchers who fash-
ioned the supermice is attempting to apply the technology to sheep and pigs, using synthe-
sized human growth genes. 50 Fed. Reg. 9760 (1985). Crossing species has generated contro-
versy. See Singer, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. at 328-30 (cited in this note); Jeremy Rifkin,
Algeny 10 (1983).
47 See Zimmerman, Biofuture at 51-62 (cited in note 43); Lee Ehrman and Joan Prob-
ber, Fundamentals of Genetic and Evolutionary Theories, in Fuller and Simmel, eds., Be-
havior Genetics at 21 (cited in note 35). See also Grobstein, From Chance to Purpose at 125
(cited in note 42).
0 Compare Zimmerman, Biofuture at 192 (cited in note 43) (predicting that time for
direct manipulation of traits like intelligence "probably won't be as much as 50 years and
could be as short as 10") with Grobstein, From Chance to Purpose at 125 (cited in note 42)
(discounting the possibility of genetically manipulating intelligence, strength, or beauty for
the foreseeable future). See also President's Commission at 33-34 (cited in note 10).
" Hearings at 226-33 (cited in note 38) (testimony of Zsolt Harsanyi, Vice-President,
DNA Sciences, E.F. Hutton), 289-92 (testimony of W. French Anderson, Chief, Molecular
Hematology Lab., National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute), 289 (testimony of Mark Skol-
nick, Professor of Medical Genetics, Univ. of Utah College of Medicine), 295 (testimony of
Theodore Friedman, Professor of Pediatrics, Univ. of California School of Medicine), 476
(testimony of Liebe Cavalieri, Professor of Biochemistry, Cornell Medical College).
"o Id. at 473 (testimony of Liebe Cavalieri, Professor of Biochemistry, Cornell Medical
College).
Recent medical advances in the treatment of the fetus have been nothing short of fan-
tastic. Administering certain drugs to the mother may prevent or minimize respiratory dis-
tress at birth. Patricia King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protec-
tion of the Unborn, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1647, 1675 (1979). Blood transfusions can now be
administered to the fetus in utero. Id. Drugs also can be surgically administered directly to
the fetus through fetoscopy. Doctors can observe the fetus throughout the pregnancy to
diagnose diseases and can even remove it temporarily for treatment. John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L.
Rev. 405, 407 (1983); King, 77 Mich. L. Rev. at 1676 n.137 (cited in this note) (experiments
removing primates from the womb for treatment and replacing them for delivery at term).
5' Zimmerman, Biofuture at 273-74 (cited in note 43). See also Hearings at 193-96
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the decade, science will likely have charted the entire genetic
makeup of some multicellular species. In less than ten years, we
may have a complete map of our entire genetic code.52
The genetic age is upon us. The metamorphosis has been lik-
ened to nuclear fission.53 While all living matter will be affected,
refashioning the human organism in particular raises uniquely
profound legal and ethical questions.
B. The Dialogue
This article probes the constitutionality-and policy mer-
its-of regulating positive genetic engineering. As the title indi-
cates, such restrictions may precipitate a collision between the con-
stitutional values of procreative liberty and equal opportunity.
Other libertarian and egalitarian values also are implicated. The
enormity and complexity of the issues requires that goals, inquir-
ies, and methodologies be modest. My goals in this article are to
spark discussion of emerging reproductive technologies and to pro-
vide an analytical framework for further study. As already noted,
the narrow query to be addressed is whether government can or
should ban extreme but safe forms of positive genetic engineering.
The method will be to question rather than to answer. Conse-
quently, the article will be cast as a dialogue, illuminating liberta-
rian and egalitarian perspectives on these developments.
The dialogue first will explore whether a congressional ban on
Genos would violate the liberty interests, in childbearing and child
rearing, of persons who wish to have Genos children. It then will
explore how such a ban might affect the liberty interests of the
fetus. Assuming that prohibiting Genos impairs some liberty claim,
the discussion will probe whether the ban serves compelling egali-
tarian interests asserted on behalf of Genos people or non-Genos
people. In this regard, it will explore whether traditional equal pro-
tection jurisprudence guarantees the rights of a genetically supe-
rior minority or of a genetically inferior majority. This part of the
dialogue also will discuss how Genos affects equality of condition
under the nobility clauses and the prohibition against slavery. Fi-
(cited in note 38) (testimony of Richard Axel, Professor of Biochemistry and Pathology,
Columbia Univ.), 207-08 (testimony of Barbara Sanford, Director, Jackson Lab.).
52 Marc Lappe, Broken Code: The Exploitation of DNA 36 (1984).
" Nicholas Wade, The Ultimate Experiment: Man-Made Evolution 2 (1977). Appropri-
ate to the nuclear fission analogy, genetically engineered substances can be deployed in bio-




nally, it will consider how Congress may formulate new egalitarian
interests using section five of the fourteenth amendment or section
two of the thirteenth amendment.
After exploring the conflict between liberty and equality that
may result from controls on genetic engineering, the dialogue will
seek a resolution of the conflict. It will consider whether an abso-
lute ban is necessary in order to respect egalitarian interests or
whether alternative schemes for distributing Genos will sufficiently
mitigate egalitarian concerns.
Finally, the discourse will consider a philosophical resolution
of the constitutional conflict. It will examine the libertarian para-
digm of Robert Nozick, the egalitarian perspective of Bruce Acker-
man, and the attempted liberty-equality synthesis of John Rawls.
The conclusion will ponder the implications of the analysis for the
future of human genetic engineering.
In the ensuing dialogue, the libertarian position favoring Ge-
nos will be denominated by the Latin word LIBERTAS;" the egal-
itarian position against the drug, by the Latin word AEQUUS.5 5 I
will try to illuminate the strongest arguments for each side.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. The Liberty to Bear and Rear Genetically Superior Children
1. Is there an Analogy between Genos and the Rights to
Contraception and Abortion?
a.) Is procreative liberty a fundamental right?
LIBERTAS: The fundamental right to procreative liberty
guarantees parental choice to bear children whose traits are en-
hanced by positive genetic engineering. The Supreme Court has
erected generous protections around the childbearing prerogative.
Not only has it clothed decisions regarding contraception" and
abortion 57 with constitutional protection, but it has resisted intru-
sions on this enclave by some powerful countervailing interests.
With respect to contraception, it has extended this guarantee to
54 Translated from Latin, libertas means "the state or condition of a freeman, a being
free, freedom, liberty, freedom from restraint or obligation, free will." Harpers' Latin Dic-
tionary 1058-59 (Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short eds. 1907).
"' Translated from Latin, aequus means "[t]hat is equal to another in any quality,
equal, like." Id. at 57.
56 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
57 Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
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the unmarried 5s and perhaps to minors.5 9 The right of abortion has
been encased in an even stronger constitutional shield. The Court
has proscribed a consent form designed to dissuade a woman from
having an abortion" and a twenty-four hour waiting period be-
tween signing an abortion consent form and undergoing the proce-
dure.61 The Court has also barred criminal liability for abortions
based on a doctor's erroneous determination of viability made in
good faith. 2
As the Supreme Court made clear in Maher v. Roe,6 3 the pro-
tection of childbearing extends beyond the right to have an
abortion:
A woman has at least an equal right to choose to carry her
fetus to term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of pro-
creation without state interference has long been recognized
as "one of the basic civil rights of man .. .fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race. 64
This passage suggests two reasons for safeguarding procreative lib-
erty in the context of genetic engineering. First, one can intuitively
" Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
" Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Justice Brennan,
joined by three other members of the Court, asserted that minors have some right to free-
dom of choice in sexual activities. Id. at 693-94. Avoiding any such implication in their
decisions, three concurring Justices stated that they would allow the state considerable lati-
tude to prohibit minors to engage in sexual activities or to use contraceptives. Id. at 702
(White, J., concurring), 703 (Powell, J., concurring), 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).
60 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444-45 (1983).
61 Id. at 450. Disregarding competing parental interests in child rearing, the Court has
extended the right of abortion to minors, has virtually abrogated the requirement of paren-
tal consent, and has hotly debated whether the minor's parents even have the right to be
informed of an impending abortion. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-10 (1981); id. at
449-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
72-75 (1976); id. at 94-95 (White, J., dissenting).
The vigor with which the Court still protects the right to an abortion was shown in the
1985 term in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). In
Thornburgh, the Court sidestepped obstacles to appellate jurisdiction in striking down on
the merits a state abortion law which included provisions requiring that the mother be given
information about alternatives to abortion. The Court said: "The states are not free, under
the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into continu-
ing pregnancies." Id. at 2178.
62 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394-95 (1979).
63 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Id. at 472 n.7 (1977), quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). How-
ever, the holding of Maher was that a state was not obligated to provide funds for abortions
to women who otherwise could not afford them. The analogous holding that the right to an
abortion does not entail a right to federal funding of abortions is Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980), upholding the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited federal funding even for
abortions necessary to preserve the mother's health.
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justify protection of this fundamentally private decision as an es-
sential component of human dignity. Second, permitting positive
genetic engineering-through abortion or other methods-can be
seen as a socially useful method of improving the species. Evolu-
tion through selection in reproduction has from at least the time of
Plato been seen as both good and natural.65 Given the extensive
constitutional protections already afforded procreative liberty, ap-
proval of this practice would not require a dramatic expansion of
constitutional safeguards.
AEQUUS: The line of bases relating to abortion represent an
unauthorized exercise of judicial power not resting upon any iden-
tifiable value embodied in the Constitution.6 6 But conceding that
current constitutional doctrine encompasses childbearing rights,
these rights still do not protect Genos. In etching the contours of
these rights, the Court, in Roe v. Wade, 7 declared:
[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," . . . are included
in [the] guarantee of personal privacy. [Earlier decisions] also
make it clear that the right has some extension to activities
relating to marriage, . procreation, . . . contraception,...
family relationships . .. , and child rearing and education. 8
So the Court itself admits that the protected sphere of liberty does
not include all childbearing activity. Perhaps perceiving the weak-
ness in justifying the right to abortion purely on the basis of pro-
creative autonomy, some commentators have attempted to justify
the right to abortion on other grounds such as the imperfect tech-
nology of contraception, 9 gender inequality in sexual freedom, 0
and the mental and physical obligations of birth imposed by the
"6 See Martin P. Golding, Ethical Issues in Biological Engineering, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
443, 471 (1968). See also Robertson, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 410 (cited in note 50).
" See generally John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 Yale L. J. 920 (1973). See also John B. Attanasio, Everyman's Constitutional Law:
A Theory of the Power of Judicial Review, 72 Geo. L. J. 1665, 1690 (1984) (arguing that the
abortion decisions are not justified by the functional rationale the Supreme Court uses to
legitimate its countermajoritarian power).
67 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68 Id. at 152-53 (emphasis added and citations omitted). For a discussion of this pas-
sage, see Note, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents
and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 157, 179 (1983).
" See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 127 (1980); Donald Re-
gan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569, 1594 (1979).
70 See Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 1008-
09 (1984); Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 Yale L. J. 599, 620-25 (1986).
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fetus.7 1 Without addressing whether these arguments buttress the
right to abortion, they certainly do not justify a right to use Genos.
To the extent that fundamental rights decisions rest on no-
tions of tradition, the Court will find it difficult to find a place for
the chemical manipulation of genetic structure in this jurispruden-
tial method.72 The Court should not embroil itself more deeply
than it already has in the fast developing realm of medical science.
In her dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc.,3 Justice O'Connor posed the dilemma:
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with
itself. As the medical risks of various abortion procedures de-
crease, the point at which the State may regulate for reasons
of maternal health is moved further forward to actual child-
birth. As medical science becomes better able to provide for
the separate existence of the fetus, the point of viability is
moved further back toward conception. 4
While grappling with emerging medical technology is to some de-
gree inescapable, the Court should proceed with cau-
tion-particularly in formulating broad-ranging, societal decisions.
In fact, Genos does not affect the individual's freedom to decide
whether to beget or bear a child as guaranteed by Roe. Rather, it
deeply implicates choosing the type of society in which we shall
live: Genos may create a master race. Constitutionally protecting
its use essentially enacts a heightened form of "Mr. Herbert Spen-
cer's Social Statics. '2 5
b.) Do notions of tradition justify constitutional protection
for new reproductive technologies?
LIBERTAS: Myriad traditions of this nation sustain the right
to use Genos. Among these are the privacy of parental decisions
regarding reproduction 6 and the privacy of the physician-patient
relationship.
The right to use Genos is related to historically protected pro-
creative decisions. Reproductive technologies from birth control to
71 See also Regan, 77 Mich. L. Rev. at 1639, 1645 (cited in note 69).
72 See Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1868 (cited in note 10).
73 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
74 462 U.S. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters
and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 Yale L. J. 639 (1986) (contesting the implica-
tions of Justice O'Connor's opinion).
75 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 15 Inter-
national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 126 (1968).
7' Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
7 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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abortion to Genos are inextricably entwined. Consequently, pro-
tecting birth control, and particularly abortion, inexorably leads to
protecting Genos. If a couple desires a child and the husband is
infertile or the wife carries a genetic defect, could the legislature
forbid reproduction by artificial insemination or by in vitro fertili-
zation of a donated egg? Surely not.78
The childbearing experience, which may be central to a wo-
man's personal identity and to her concept of a meaningful life,
should not lightly be impaired.79 Roe itself acknowledged that vari-
ous reproductive techniques are related
by new embryological data that purport to indicate that con-
ception is a "process" over time, rather than an event, and by
new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the
"morning-after" pill, implantation of embryos, artificial in-
semination, and even artificial wombs."
If one technique of selective reproduction-abortion-is constitu-
tionally protected in the name of reproductive privacy, the same
protection from unwarranted state interference likely extends to
all such techniques.
Once the above artificial reproductive techniques are permit-
ted for some purposes, government certainly should not be allowed
to determine whether a particular purpose is satisfactory or
whether a particular individual is undertaking the process for that
purpose.8 Likely, the standards for doing so would be constitu-
tionally impermissible. For example, could government permit in
vitro fertilization to overcome infertility but not to improve intelli-
gence? Alternatively, if infertility is established, could government
preclude the infertile couple from using the reproductive material
71 See Robertson, 59 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 957-67 (cited in note 34) (arguing that procrea-
tive liberty affords parents broad discretion in fashioning their children); Note, Frozen Em-
bryos: The Constitution on Ice, 19 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 267, 276-81 (1985) (arguing that Roe
v. Wade protects a procreative right to freeze embryos and to destroy frozen embryos). But
see Ozar, The Case Against Thawing Unused Frozen Embryos, 15 Hastings Ctr. Report 7
(Aug. 1985) (arguing that the community's interest in human life and the absence of the
frozen embryo from the womb restrict the option of destroying it).
79 John Robertson has aptly observed:
Full procreative freedom would include both the freedom not to reproduce and the
freedom to reproduce when, with whom, and by what means one chooses. As reproduc-
tive and work patterns change, legal recognition of this aspect of procreative freedom
may be necessary to permit some women to fit pregnancy and childbirth successfully
into their life plans.
Robertson, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 406 (cited in note 50).
80 410 U.S. at 161.
0' See id. at 153-54; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
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of particularly intelligent (or otherwise desirable) individuals?
Moreover, standards for appraising the purposes to be served
by reproductive techniques, even if permissible, would be unman-
ageable. Suppose that a couple were physically capable of having
children but did not wish to do so because the child would likely
be born with some genetic defect. How severe must that defect be
before the couple should have a right to obtain (possibly purchase)
and use the reproductive material of someone else? Suppose the
couple considers a child below a certain intelligence or size to be
genetically defective. Lastly, suppose that two people consider re-
production to be a meaningful experience only if they have a child
of a certain kind. Could government deprive that couple of
donated sperm, eggs, or wombs in order to thwart the couple's re-
productive plan? Moreover, how would government regulate the
distribution of, for example, semen? Would it enter the bedroom
or test the resultant children? Questions like these may have pro-
voked Justice Blackmun's suggestion in Roe that constitutional
safeguards extend to these various reproductive technologies.82
AEQUUS: The enterprise of divining traditions upon which to
rest constitutional decisions is problematic. It is difficult to charac-
terize Roe itself as a protection of traditional rights. A majority of,
the states restricted abortion for more than a century before the
decision."' Broad readings extending Roe are even more dubious.
Further, judicially declared "fundamental rights" tend to be
malleable. The rights announced in Griswold and Roe have been
limited considerably in recent Supreme Court decisions. Maher v.
Roe" and Harris v. McRae 5 conclude that the right to procreative
liberty does not include a right to state financial support of abor-
tions. Bowers v. Hardwick8 suggests that Roe v. Wade does not
create a general zone of personal sexual privacy into which govern-
82 Roe, 410 U.S. at 161.
83 Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding denial of state funding for abortions).
8 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (upholding denial of federal funding for abortions)
("[A]lithough government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her
freedom of choice, it need not remove those obstacles not of its own creation.").
66 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (upholding state sodomy law). The jurisprudence of funda-
mental rights has proved malleable on other occasions: In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927),
the Supreme Court upheld compulsory sterilization of imbeciles. More recently, on the other
hand, the California Supreme Court invoked the jurisprudence of fundamental rights to
invalidate a state statute prohibiting sterilization of mentally disabled persons. Conserva-
torship of Valerie N., 40 Cal.3d 143, 160-62, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 398-400, 707 P.2d 760, 771-
73 (1985). The court in Valerie N. argued that by withholding sterilization from an incom-
petent woman, the statute deprived her of her only realistic opportunity for contraception
and, onsequently, restricted her chances for self-fulfillment.
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ment is forbidden to intrude. Such malleability readily allows Con-
gress to ban Genos without relinquishing the doctrine of substan-
tive due process. Congress rightly can conclude that our society
comprehends no tradition protecting the right to remodel another
human being genetically.
Even if it were law rather than obiter dicta, language in Roe
about artificial insemination and other new reproductive tech-
niques would not legitimate Genos. All of these techniques concern
the process of conceiving, while Genos concerns the process of
fashioning a particular type of child.
2. Is there an Analogy between Genos and the Right to Se-
lect the Education of One's Children?
LIBERTAS: Liberty in child rearing and liberty in child bear-
ing both shield the family from governmental intrusion. The
Court has recognized liberty interests protecting the nuclear and
extended family structures.8 Indeed, it has afforded parents rather
broad leeway, concluding that they retain their child rearing pre-
rogatives even if they have not been "model parents."8
The right to form the body and mind with Genos is analogous
to molding the child through education. The Court has been par-
ticularly interested in safeguarding parental control over the
child's education. It has protected the parents' right to choose the
school that their child will attend ° and to influence her education
in the public school system."' It even has enforced the parental
right to choose the child's religious upbringing, 92 an area that may
be more personal to the child than Genos itself.
Protecting Genos as part of the educational aspect of child
Acknowledging that it "has frequently emphasized the importance of the family,"
the Court observed in Stanley v. Illinois :
The rights to conceive and raise one's children have been deemed "essential,". "ba-
sic civil rights of man," . . . and "[r]ights far more precious ... than property rights"
.... "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder."
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), discussed in Robertson, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 414 n.23 (cited in note
50).
so Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that liberty interests
protected under substantive due process include "extended" as well as nuclear family);
Note, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 176-77 (cited in note 68).
89 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 & n.7 (1982), quoted in Note, 58 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. at 176 n.91 (cited in note 68). These cases do not, however, delineate the scope of
parents' authority over their children. 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 177.
10 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
91 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
"2 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972).
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rearing may advance other constitutional interests in addition to
that of parental liberty.93 In building the foundation for speech
and expression, education is closely aligned with first amendment
interests in self-actualization as espoused by Thomas Emerson.94
The very essence of a free society lies in the liberty of each individ-
ual citizen to develop in the direction that she pleases. Genos ad-
vances the prospects for self-actualization of its recipients: in-
creased strength and intelligence both broaden their range of
opportunities and augment their chances of realizing their life
plans.
Other first amendment interests, which benefit society more
broadly, also justify the protection of Genos. In Emerson's view,
freedom of expression nurtures not only self-actualization, but also
the pursuit of knowledge and truth and, ultimately, inspires social
change.95 Genos unequivocally fuels the enterprise of learning. The
superior cognitive and communicative ability it produces will en-
hance the process of societal development by advancing the discov-
ery and articulation of new ideas.
AEQUUS: Genos may well fuel social change and the pursuit
of knowledge. The social change that occurs may, however, take us
in the wrong direction or produce undesirable results. Likewise,
whether Genos advances self-fulfillment depends upon how that
concept is defined.
Even if the first amendment is designed to promote self-actu-
alization,96 this concept does not so clearly relate to the biological
capacity to achieve as it relates to achieving one's natural biologi-
cal capacity. While the drug may augment the self-fulfillment of
Genos people by increasing their chances to attain some ideal of
strength and intelligence,97 this development travels well beyond
the function of the first amendment.
Indeed, Genos actually may undermine first amendment val-
ues. Comparing American democracy to allarge town meeting, Al-
exander Meildejohn claimed that the essential purpose of first
amendment jurisprudence is to ensure that all speak, so that the
will of the majority can be ascertained. By guaranteeing the voice
of each member of society, the first amendment supplies a precon-
"3 Shapiro, 48 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 358-62 (cited in note 10).
" Emerson, Freedom of Expression at 6 (cited in note 2).
" Id. at 6-7.
See generally Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commer-
cial Speech, 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. 437, 448 n.28 (1980).
7 Because the drug may diminish the self-esteem of non-Genos people, it may well
impede their self-actualization. See notes 338-42 and accompanying text below.
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dition of democratic governance.9 8 In Meiklejohn's "town meet-
ing," court-imposed time, place, and manner restrictions ensure
that no individual or group will dominate the meeting and thereby
drown out the views of others.9 9 Superior cognitive abilities af-
forded by Genos will facilitate such domination. Insofar as Genos
people may better perceive what is best for society, perhaps their
ideas should win out. Nonetheless, even Genos people with the
best intentions likely will skew public debate in their own
interests.
Of course, first amendment jurisprudence already counte-
nances some gross disparities in speaking capacity predicated on
wealth. 100 Still, Genos people may possess both superior wealth
and natural ability; only the wealthy will be able to afford the
drug, and superior natural ability will simply help the rich to get
richer. Consequently, the drug will exacerbate the substantial dif-
ferences in communicative capability that already threaten free
expression.
Moreover, parents' interest in their children's education is not
analogous to their interest in Genos. The type of power that Genos
exerts over a child's development eclipses the control afforded by
education. Parental control over the educational process is limited
and diminishes over time.10 1 Genos affects a person in more dra-
matic and irrevocable ways. One subjected to the procedure will be
labeled as a Genos person for life. Even if it did not produce dis-
tinguishing physical characteristics, Genos would impose distin-
guishing behavioral characteristics that might be difficult-and
perhaps psychologically trying-to suppress.
B. The Liberty Interests of a Genetically Superior Fetus
1. Does a Pre-viable Fetus Have Rights?
AEQUUS: In determining the magnitude of the asserted lib-
erty interest in Genos, one must balance the countervailing liberty
interests of the fetus. A fetus has rights. John Rawls claims that
beings who have the "capacity for moral personality" are entitled
to equal justice.102 Robert Nozick contends that "[t]o be an I, a
self, is to have the capacity for reflexive self-reference"' 03 that ap-
SS Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 24-28 (1960).
g9 Id.
' See notes 6-7 above.
Ackerman, Social Justice at 142-50 (cited in note 69).
:02 Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 504-10 (cited in note 8).
103 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 78 (1981).
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proximates the capacity for self-knowledge.1 0 4 A fetus has the self-
contained capacity to develop moral personality or self-refer-
ence-whereas a sperm cell or an egg does not.105 Moreover,
shortly after conception a fetus is a separate genetic entity from its
mother.106
Moral capacity and separate existence demand constitutional
protection. While the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
fetuses should be considered human at conception, it has not re-
jected all claims of fetal rights. Although Roe rhetorically denies all
such rights,10 the decision postulates a sliding scale that allows the
state to recognize powerful fetal rights that, at viability, even
trump maternal rights.10 8
It is particularly important that constitutional jurisprudence
acknowledge fetal rights in the context of positive genetic engi-
neering. Whatever the possible benefits to the child and society,
the degree of control that Genos affords parents-the irreversible
manipulation of the child's genetic constitution-makes the cost of
error too great to ignore. Moreover, the law does not afford parents
absolute control over their children. For example, the Supreme
104 Id. at 78-82. The concept of reflexive self-reference is quite complex. It parallels
linguistic self-reference. Id. at 82. It also can be explained as a process of synthesizing past
actions and precedents to mold the self. Id. at 89-90.
05 Id. at 78-82. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 161 (conception is a process of gradual fetal
development over time).
To determine whether a particular being deserves protection, Jeremy Bentham asked
not whether a being could talk or reason but whether it could suffer. Jeremy Bentham, An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation ch. 17, § 1, n.1, cited in Robert
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 337 n.9 (1974). The nervous system of a ten-week-old
fetus seems to respond to local stimuli. Horace Robertson, Toward Rational Boundaries of
Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and
Wrongful Life, 1978 Duke L. J. 1401, 1421. See also Robertson, 59 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 970
(cited in note 34) (biologists disagree about whether the fetus actually feels pain before the
twelfth week of pregnancy). A fetus that feels pain merits protection under Bentham's theo-
ries. Bentham, Morals and Legislation at ch. 17, § 4, n.1, cited in Nozick, Anarchy, State,
and Utopia at 337-38 (cited in this note).
100 King, 77 Mich. L. Rev. at 1673-74 (cited in note 50). The Roe Court acknowledged
this fact. Id. at 1660; Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
107 410 U.S. at 158 ("[T]he word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not include the unborn.").
108 Id. at 163-64. Patricia King uses the capacity criterion to predicate fetal rights on
the potential to develop human traits such as rationality. King, 77 Mich. L. Rev. at 1668-69,
1677 (cited in note 50). She places fetal rights on a developmental continuum of rights,
maintaining that fetuses cannot make the same claims as children, who, in turn, cannot
claim the rights that teenagers or adults can. Id. at 1672-73. This developmental perspective
supplies one basis for a fetal claim for protection against Genos. Unlike the aborted fe-
tus-that will cease to exist after the abortion-the Genos fetus will live to see the day
when it not only has constitutional protection, but when its genetic engineering will have a
real and lasting effect on its life.
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Court has struck down parents' authority over the abortion deci-
sions of their minor children.109 This suggests that the familial re-
lationship is not immune from state intrusions.110 Such a ruling
also recognizes a liberty interest in the child that prohibits physi-
cal intrusions like Genos."' One cannot distinguish Genos based
on the notion that the fetus cannot consent whereas the minor can.
Unemancipated, immature minors-who by definition cannot de-
cide-have a constitutional right to obtain abortions by petitioning
a court or an administrative tribunal 1 2
A mother's decision to carry a fetus to term-in other words,
her consent to give birth-is another basis for recognizing fetal
rights. Several commentators have predicated the rights of a viable
fetus on the theory that a woman implicitly relinquishes her own
autonomy interests by deciding to carry her child to the point of
viability. 13 This rationale can be carried one step further by as-
serting the rights of even a pre-viable fetus against the parents on
the basis of their decision to carry the fetus to term. 4 Indeed,
several commentators have advocated that a child be permitted a
right of action against a mother who was at fault in causing it
harm in utero."5
The courts have recognized a duty to protect the fetus from
prenatal injuries, allowing recovery by the child if she is born
alive. 1 6 Furthermore, most courts that have faced the issue have
:00 See note 61 above.
"o In his dissent in H.L. v. Matheson, Justice Marshall suggested that state intrusions
into this decision of the child alter the normal pattern of interaction within the family. 450
U.S. at 438 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). One might retort that court approval of an abor-
tion for an unemancipated, immature minor intrudes on a family's self-developed pattern of
parent-child decision making. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 657 (1979) (White, J.,
dissenting).
I See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Minors,
as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.").
M Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.
113 See Ackerman, Social Justice at 128-29 (cited in note 69); Regan, 77 Mich. L. Rev.
at 1643 (cited in note 69).
114 See Robertson, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 442, 446-47 (cited in note 50).
's See, e.g., id. at 447 n.129 (mother should be liable for engaging in activities that are
toxic to the fetus during pregnancy and failing to undergo therapy necessary for a healthy
birth); Note, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 47 (1978)
(advocating liability for parental negligence); Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The
Right of a Child Against its Mother, 10 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 582, 607 (1976) (advocating gross
negligence standard). See also Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980)
(child allowed action against mother for damages to child's teeth caused by mother's use of
medication during pregnancy). But see Note, 95 Yale L. J. at 614-25 (cited in note 70) (argu-
ing that recognition of such fetal claims violates maternal liberty).
Ile See W. Page Keeton, Dan Dobbs, Robert Keeton, and David Owen, Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts 367 (5th ed. 1984) ("Prosser & Keeton"), and cases cited
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allowed recovery when the fetus is born alive even though the in-
jury was inflicted before it was viable or "quick." 1 7 Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts states:
Viability of course does not affect the question of legal exis-
tence of the unborn, and therefore of the defendant's duty,
and it is a most unsatisfactory criterion, since it is a relative
matter, depending on the health of the mother and child and
many other matters in addition to the stage of
development.118
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts advocates recovery
for injury occurring at any time after conception, providing that
tortious conduct and causation can be established." 9 The criminal
law and the law of inheritance also recognize the rights of a pre-
viable fetus. 2 e
Controlling Genos is the only way to protect fetal liberty inter-
ests. The drug enables parents permanently to shackle their chil-
dren to a particular life. Any possibility of living as a non-Genos
person is lost: daily existence may be punctuated by jealousy, ridi-
cule, and exclusion. Essential human dignity may also be compro-
mised by the realization that one is the product of genetic
fabrication.1 2' These interests can only be protected if the fetus
therein.
117 Id. at 368-69. A majority of jurisdictions have allowed recovery under their wrongful
death statutes when the fetus was not even born alive. Id. at 369-70.
118 Id. at 369. The authors defend recovery for injury to a pre-viable fetus born alive by
emphasizing that viability is a relative matter contingent on many circumstances and that
the child remains injured regardless of when the injury occurred. Id. See also Robertson,
1978 Duke L. J. at 1428, 1438 (cited in note 105).
However, most federal courts have rejected fetal damage claims brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action in damages for any person deprived of consti-
tutional rights under color of state law. These courts have concluded that the fetus is not a
"person" within the meaning of the statute. See Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248, 250 (9th
Cir. 1979) (dicta); Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 800 (W.D. Va. 1981); Poole v. Ends-
ley, 371 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (N.D. Fla. 1974). This view is not universally shared: despite
several contrary federal decisions, a federal district court in Connecticut followed the trend
of state authority, declaring a five and one-half month old, viable fetus a person under sec-
tion 1983. Douglas v. Town of Hartford, Connecticut, 542 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (D. Conn.
1982).
1;9 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 869 (1977).
120 Guido Calabresi, Ideas, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law 94 (1985); Note, 95 Yale L.
J. at 601-03 (cited in note 70). Indeed, Calabresi has argued that Roe v. Wade ignored the
longstanding "gravitational pull-which said that for some purposes a fetus was surely pro-
tected by our law." Id. at 95.
121 In reference to cloning, Laurence Tribe has remarked:
Yet one's sense of "selfhood" or "personhood," and the related experience of one's au-
tonomous individuality, may depend, at least in some cultural settings, on the ability to
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has rights that are powerful enough to trump those of its parents.
LIBERTAS: Children have certain narrow liberty interests.
However, these interests are not implicated by Genos for several
reasons. First, while minor children have some rights, the rights of
ten-week-old fetuses are much more limited. Second, while a court
may be able to make an individualized determination about the
benefits of an abortion to a particular fetus, it is much harder to
assess the benefits of Genos for a given child. Third, limits on ma-
ternal abortion decisions, like limits on the ability of parents to
interfere in their child's abortion decision, grow out of skepticism
that the parent will adequately consider her child's interests when
they diverge from her own.1 ' Genos does not produce such a con-
flict of interest between parents and child.
These points require further discussion. Under Roe, a fetus
has no cognizable liberty interests at the time a decision to use
Genos would be made. In Roe, the Supreme Court declared that
"the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not include the unborn. '' M As a result, the state cannot interfere
during the first trimester of pregnancy with the decision by the
mother and her attending physician to abort.12 4 If the woman can
choose no life at all for the fetus, it follows a fortiori that she can
choose a superior life for it-a result that certainly seems more
desirable from the standpoint of the fetus.
Even if the fetus possesses some liberty interests, it certainly
has none that overcome the parent's right to use Genos.125 Fetal
rights against parents are very limited in scope. It is clear that par-
ents may not abuse their fetus in utero with the specific intent of
causing imbecility or physical deformity, but the legitimacy of neg-
think of oneself as neither fabricated genetically nor programmed neurologically....
Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Limits of the Fourth Discontinuity: The
Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 So. Cal. L. Rev. 617, 648 (1973). See also President's
Commission at 68 (cited in note 10).
122 Joseph Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervision of Pa-
rental Autonomy, 86 Yale L. J. 645, 662 (1977).
" 410 U.S. at 158. For various perspectives on fetal rights in the context of abortion,
see generally Margery Shaw and A. Edward Doudera, eds., Defining Human Life: Medical,
Legal, and Ethical Implications (1983).
1' Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. After the first trimester, the state can regulate to promote the
mother's health. After viability, the state's interest in the potential life of the fetus becomes
sufficiently compelling to empower it to proscribe abortion "except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." Id.
at 164-65.
125 An interesting question is what happens when parents disagree about the decision
of whether a conceived embryo should become a Genos child. Consider Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 71 (state may not require married woman to obtain husband's consent to abortion).
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ligence actions for in utero harm is far less certain.12 6 The contro-
versy over parental tort liability brings into focus a deeper issue: if
a pre-viable fetus brought to term has some right not to be harmed
by its parents, what counts as harm? If parents would not have
had a particular child at all without Genos, that child would seem
to have no complaint.
Most importantly, in contrast to in utero mutilation, few peo-
ple would consider Genos an unambiguous detriment. If they did,
no need to ban or regulate it would exist. Reasonable people will
differ on the advantages of Genos's use. The question then be-
comes: "Who decides?"
2. Should the Parents or the Government Determine
Genetic Liberty Interests on Behalf of a Pre-Viable Fetus?
LIBERTAS: The worst answer to this question is a blanket
ruling that no genetic engineering is allowed. The best solution is
to allow the use of all available technologies and eliminate the in-
trusion of government into a couple's personal decisions about pro-
creation-decisions that the government is unlikely to improve.
The courts have already recognized this and have given parents
broad discretion to decide what is harmful and what is beneficial
to their children.
"Wrongful life" suits provide some guidance on this point. In
these suits, a child seeks recovery against a physician for a genetic
deformity on the theory that the physician's failure to inform its
parents of the deformity in time to abort caused it to endure a life
of suffering.127 Many jurisdictions that have faced such claims have
denied them.128 Most courts have justified this result by emphasiz-
ing the impossibility of identifying the harm in such a situation:
"The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference be-
tween his life with defects against the utter void of non-existence,
but it is impossible to make such a determination.' ' 29 Relying on
this same rationale, courts that have allowed "wrongful life" suits
126 See note 115 above.
127 Prosser & Keeton at 370 (cited in note 116).
128 Id. at 371 (citing cases); Thomas Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medi-
cal Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C. L. Rev. 713, 713-14
(1982).
129 Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 25, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967), discussed in Prosser
& Keeton at 371 (cited in note 116). New Jersey now allows special damages in wrongful life
actions. Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984). See also Payton v.
Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982), a DES decision based on "wrongful life"
case rationales. Because DES helped to prevent miscarriages, the court permitted defend-




have limited recovery to special damages such as medical ex-
penses. 130 If a child with clear genetic disadvantages lacks a claim
not to have been born, surely the advantaged Genos child lacks a
claim that he would rather never have been born than to have been
genetically engineered.
Recovery under wrongful life theory benefits the child; the
correlative parental cause of action is "wrongful birth." In a wrong-
ful birth action, parents seek to recover for the impairment of their
abortion decision caused by failure to be informed of their fetus's
genetic defects.131 In sharp contrast to the hostile treatment of
children's wrongful life claims, courts have overwhelmingly ap-
proved parents' wrongful birth claims. 13 2 Widespread rejection of
wrongful life actions illustrates the reluctance of judges to em-
power themselves-or perhaps any other governmental branch-to
override parental decisions in order to protect fetal interests. 33
Likewise, the courts' nearly unanimous recognition of an action for
wrongful birth reveals their preference for leaving such genetic en-
gineering issues to parents.
Moreover, the decision-making rights of parents already ex-
tend to a variety of eugenics. The predicate for wrongful birth
cases is the inviolable right of abortion prior to viability. 3 4 The
abortion prerogative underwrites a type of positive as well as nega-
tive genetic engineering. Today, for example, amniocentesis allows
parents to select their child's sex and to screen for a variety of
0SO See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Sie-
mieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 134 Ill. App. 3d 823, 480 N.E.2d 1227 (1985); Pro-
canik, 97 N.J. at 339, 478 A.2d at 755; Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656
P.2d 483 (1983) (en banc); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 322 S.E.2d 567 (N.C. App. 1984).
,' See Prosser & Keeton at 370-71 (cited in note 116).
152 See id. (citing cases); Rogers, 33 S.C. L. Rev. at 713-14 (cited in note 128).
" California's experience in this connection is instructive. Curlender v. Bio-science
Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980), upheld a complaint by a child
against its parents for not aborting it. The California legislature reversed this result. Cal.
Civ. Code § 43.6 (West 1982). Later in 1982, the California Supreme Court specifically held
that-even in the context of a child's wrongful life action-the parents rather than the
courts are delegated the authority to make the abortion decision on behalf of their deformed
child. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
134 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64. Because the parents can abort for any reason prior to
viability, they can clearly abort for eugenic reasons. As a result, wrongful birth cases thrust
upon doctors the responsibility of making parents informed decision makers in their role as
genetic engineers. This parental role is grounded in two separate claims. The first is the
parents' right to exercise control over the reproductive process in their own interests; the
second is their right to represent the interests of the fetus in this vital decision. Alexander
Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic Counseling: A Dissent to the "Wrongful Life"
Debate, 48 Ind. L. J. 581, 602 (1973); Alexander Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counsel-
ing, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 618, 648, 653 (1979).
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genetic defects.13 5 The right to abortion bestowed in Roe in prac-
tice allows people to engage in a form of genetic engineering. A
fortiori, it must confer the right to engage in genetic engineering
without using abortion. If the prospect of genetic manipulation
through abortion is permitted under the trimester system in Roe,
then surely genetic manipulation that takes place by improving
rather than destroying the fetus must be permissible. To conclude
otherwise would be to encourage the admittedly crude and draco-
nian process of genetic engineering through abortion. 36
Granting parental control over positive and negative genetic
engineering also accords with the broad discretion generally af-
forded parents to decide medical matters for their children. While
courts sometimes have been willing to override this discretion
when the child's life is in imminent danger, parental choice is quite
broad when life is not immediately threatened-even when there is
grave risk of eventual death.137 Exemplifying this position is In re
135 Harold Green, Genetic Technology- Law and Policy for the Brave New World, 48
Ind. L. J. 559, 560 (1973). In vitro fertilization and other new techniques should further
expand parents' capability for genetic engineering. See John Fletcher, Moral Problems and
Ethical Issues in Prospective Human Gene Therapy, 69 Va. L. Rev. 515, 530-31 (1983); Rob-
ertson, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 423 (cited in note 50). The wrongful life action clearly increases the
incentives for negative genetic engineering: the prospect of facing the jury puts doctors
under pressure to diagnose and inform parents of fetal imperfections-and to encourage
them to abort in some circumstances. See Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining
the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 Yale L. J. 1488, 1505
(1978) (wide range of duties should be imposed on doctors to keep abreast of genetic diag-
nostic techniques and to inform parents of genetic risks).
136 There are also significant practical problems with relying heavily on abortion as a
means of genetic engineering. Such reliance could significantly increase the number of
abortions.
137 See Note, The Outer Limits of Parental Autonomy: Withholding Medical Treat-
ment From Children, 42 Ohio St. L. J. 813, 818 (1981) ("In situations that are not immi-
nently life-threatening, courts generally give parents great discretion and uphold their deci-
sions as long as they are in the child's best interests and not arbitrary."); Goldstein, 86 Yale
L. J. at 651 (cited in note 122) (courts should respect parental discretion even in life-threat-
ening medical decisions unless parents refuse to treat a child who can expect "a life of rela-
tively normal, healthy growth toward adulthood").
Judge Gesell has suggested in dicta that "to the extent the [federal] regulation is read
to eliminate the role of the infant's parents in choosing an appropriate course of medical
treatment, its application may in some cases infringe upon the interests outlined in cases
such as. . . Roe v. Wade. . . and Griswold v. Connecticut." American Academy of Pediat-
rics v. Heckler, 561 F.Supp. 395, 403 (D.D.C. 1983). American Academy of Pediatrics invali-
dated federal regulations that prohibited discrimination in the medical treatment of handi-
capped fetuses on grounds that the Department of Health and Human Services failed to
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act. In a related case, Judge Wexler echoed
Judge Gesell by suggesting that for "the federal government to involve itself in the choice
among alternative reasonable medical treatments for handicapped children ... would raise
grave constitutional questions concerning the rights to privacy." United States v. Univ.
Hosp. of State Univ. of New York, 575 F. Supp. 607, 616 (1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.
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Quinlan,"' which allowed the parents to represent their comatose
teenage child in deciding to cut off life support systems. Also illus-
trative are the Infant Doe cases, which allowed parents to discon-
tinue providing the necessities of life to their physically impaired
newborns. 3 9 These cases demonstrate that parents can make im-
portant medical decisions for their offspring beyond viability. If
parents are empowered to decide questions of life and death for
their children, they should certainly be allowed to decide whether
to use Genos.
AEQUUS: The courts have frequently allowed governmental
assessments of the child's interests to supersede calculations made
by the parents. The state also can assert its own interests in paren-
tal decisions, interests that may trump those of the parents and
the child. Notable examples include child labor laws, child abuse
and neglect laws, and post-viability abortion restrictions. Some
state laws currently address genetic engineering itself.
In a clear example of overriding parental liberty, the Supreme
Court upheld the application of child labor laws against a Jeho-
vah's Witness. The state's interest overrode the guardian's free ex-
ercise claim that selling religious literature was part of the child's
religious duty.14 0 Similarly, every jurisdiction in the United States
has laws proscribing child abuse and neglect.1 4, Many commenta-
tors have noted the breadth and vagueness of these statutes:14 2
1984).
Recently, the Supreme Court set aside a newly promulgated version of these regulations
as unsupported by statutory authority. In a footnote, the Court intimated that broad paren-
tal discretion over the treatment of their child may be a matter of constitutional right. See
Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 2113 n.13 (1986) (plurality opinion).
1" 70 N.J. 10, 38-42, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (1976).
139 Rather than predicate the parents' power on their status as representatives of the
child, the Infant Doe Court focused on the parents' rights outweighing those of the child
when the child lacked an opportunity for a minimally adequate life. Note, Withholding
Treatment from Defective Infants: "Infant Doe" Postmortem, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 224,
235 (1983).
'4 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court remarked:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.
Id. at 170. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory
vaccination law against parental liberty claim).
141 Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs. 226, 240-41 (Summer 1975); Note, The Child's
Rights to "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness": Suits by Children Against Parents
for Abuse, Neglect and Abandonment, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 154, 178-79 (1981).
141 See, e.g., Mnookin, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 240-42 (cited in note 141); Sheila
Reynolds and Roy Lacoursiere, Interminable Child Neglect/Custody Cases: Are there Better
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"typical language is the definition of a neglected child as one who
'lacks proper parental care because of the faults or habits of his
parents.' -143 This standard permits the state to intervene in the
parent-child relationship for myriad reasons, many of which are
quite appropriate. Among these are physical abuse, sexual abuse,
absence of a "moral" environment, and failure to provide food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision.144 These
various grounds generate an estimated one million reported cases
of child abuse and neglect annually that produce an estimated
150,000 to 200,000 court actions. 45 The scope of accepted state in-
trusion into the familial relationship is likewise large: a substantial
percentage of the cases conclude by separating the child from the
home.148
Thus, the general principle is that the courts are empowered
to intervene in family decisions if the government can persuade
them that such intervention would serve "the best interests of the
child. 1 47 Significantly, many states have extended this protection
against child abuse to fetuses. Sanctions include withdrawal of pa-
rental custody of the newborn child, criminal penalties, and injunc-
tions forcing medical treatment during pregnancy. 48 Strikingly,
the state's conception of a child's well-being may overcome paren-
tal choice even in the core area of procreative freedom itself. The
Roe decision specifically allows the state's interests in the potential
life of the fetus to supersede the mother's autonomy over her own
Alternatives?, 21 Faro. L. Quart. 239, 258-73 (1982-83).
"' Reynolds and Lacoursiere, 21 Faro. L. Quart. at 264 (cited in note 142), quoting
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.03(B) (Baldwin 1978).
144 Reynolds and Lacoursiere, 21 Faro L. Quart. at 264-65 (cited in note 142); Mnookin,
39 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 240-41 & n.68 (cited in note 141). See Laurence Houlgate, The
Child & the State 130 (1980) ("[C]ourts have been known to grant neglect petitions on the
ground that parents have failed to provide their child with the proper moral environment,
proper care, safe home conditions, and satisfaction of emotional needs.").
14 Note, Lawyering for the Abused Child: "You Can't Go Home Again," 29 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1216, 1217 & n.10 (1982).
'4' Reynolds and Lacoursiere, 21 Faro. L. Quart. at 265 (cited in note 142).
147 Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child 3-7, 53-64 (1973); Note, 29 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1220-27 (cited in note 145). Not only
are the courts and legislatures involved, hut administrative agencies permeate the process.
Mnookin, 39 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 241-42 (cited in note 141); Reynolds and Lacoursiere,
21 Fano. L. Quart. at 267-68 (cited in note 142).
14" Note, 95 Yale L. J. at 604-05 (cited in note 70). Consider also the decision in
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), in which the Supreme Court upheld the state's right to
infringe on parental authority when the physical or mental health of the child is in jeopardy.
442 U.S. at 603. Genos affects one's whole genetic makeup-an interest at least as funda-




Although the courts have, by permitting abortion, indirectly
recognized a parental right to engage in negative genetic engineer-
ing, this does not suggest that parents have exclusive or absolute
rights to do so. The government is also involved in the enterprise
of negative genetic engineering. Examples include prohibiting in-
cest and requiring that couples be tested for disease and other
problems prior to marriage. 150 Here, too, state assessments of the
rights of the unborn have prevailed over competing appraisals
made by parents.
The state not only represents the child, but it also may assert
its own interests in order to trump individual liberty claims, re-
gardless of whether those claims are asserted by parents or by the
affected children themselves. With regard to genetic engineering,
the Supreme Court in the past has approved compulsory steriliza-
tion for imbecility.15 ' While particular applications of this power
are open to question, the existence of some state prerogative ap-
pears to continue. 52
In areas other than genetic engineering, the Court has sup-
ported compulsory education laws in the face of parental opposi-
tion. 53 It also has sustained laws against polygamy despite their
infringement on certain conceptions of the family founded on reli-
gious beliefs. 54 Similarly, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 55 the
Court endorsed compulsory child vaccination statutes over the pro-
"' Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
150 Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment
of the Technology of Cloning, 47 So. Cal. L. Rev. 476, 534-35 (1974).
'5' Buck, 274 U.S. at 207-08.
151 The Roe court cited Buck v. Bell for the proposition that the Court has in the past
refused to recognize an unlimited right over control of one's body. 410 U.S. at 154. Compare
John Nowak, Ronald Rotunda, and J. Nelson Young, Constitutional Law 737 (1983), expres-
sing doubt that the Supreme Court would follow Buck and uphold compulsory sterilization
of imbeciles today. The other Supreme Court case dealing with sterilization, Skinner, 316
U.S. at 535, rested on equal protection grounds. Id. at 538. In Skinner, the Court struck
down a law that authorized the sterilization of convicts who had committed more than two
offenses involving moral turpitude. The Court concluded that because sterilization was so
intrusive, the judiciary should carefully monitor it to ensure that it was not administered
invidiously or arbitrarily. Id. at 541.
", Andrew Kleinfield, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the
State, 4 Far. L. Quart. 409, 414 (1970). As the Court indicated in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982), compulsory education advances both the interests of individual children by
equipping them to compete and the interests of a democratic society by supplying tools to
govern. Id. at 221.
I" Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878).
-55 197 U.S. 11 (1905). See also Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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test of parents and children alike. Recognizing that notions of lib-
erty must be constrained by considerations of order, the Court
opined:
If [foregoing compulsory vaccination] be the privilege of a mi-
nority then a like privilege would belong to each individual of
the community, and the spectacle would be presented of the
welfare and safety of an entire population being subordinated
to the notions of a single individual who chooses to remain a
part of that population. We are unwilling to hold it to be an
element in the liberty secured by the Constitution of the
United States that one person, or a minority of persons, resid-
ing in any community and enjoying the benefits of its local
government, should have the power thus to dominate the ma-
jority when supported in their action by the authority of the
State.'56
Accordingly, Congress could reasonably conclude that any lib-
erty-based reproductive interests parents may possess in the use of
Genos are outweighed by the risks to the child's interest in human
dignity and by broader social concerns. The use of Genos raises
such broad public questions that society cannot afford to allow in-
dividual parents and children to assert a liberty interest that
would supplant society's power to decide. Indeed, justifying Ge-
nos's availability as an expansion of either fetal or parental liberty
is in some ways incongruous: even for those families with the re-
sources to afford the drug, protecting its use may shackle rather
than liberate. The "freedom to choose" may be a Hobson's choice:
parents who would rather not use the drug must either saddle their
children with what they as parents consider an unsavory existence
or leave them with a gross competitive disadvantage.
LIBERTAS: Liberty exacts costs. One such cost is the
thrusting of difficult decisions onto individuals; but the alternative
is relinquishing the individual decision-making prerogative to the
government. Another cost of liberty is a degree of economic ine-
quality. But again, the alternatives may be unpalatable: a far lower
average level of well-being157 and the possibility of far greater eco-
156 197 U.S. at 37-38. Concerning the scope of parental discretion in individual medical
treatment decisions, Professor Goldstein generally supports broad parental discretion but
also recognizes the "generally applicable societal judgments that no parents shall have a
choice" in decisions like compulsory vaccination. Goldstein, 86 Yale L. J. at 648 (cited in
note 122). See also Green, 48 Ind. L. J. at 568 n.27 (cited in note 135) (discussing broad
scope of states' public health powers).
157 See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 42-44 (1960).
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nomic, social, and political stratification imposed by the govern-
ment.15  Thus, while the state may be justified in some instances
either in asserting its judgment of the child's best interest over
that of the parents or in asserting its own interests in parental de-
cisions, there must be definite limits on its ability to do so.
Laws by which the state oversees maternal behavior during
pregnancy clearly violate procreational autonomy. These laws are
rooted in the absolute dependence of the fetus on maternal con-
duct, and constitute a rapidly expanding and potentially open-
ended burden on the parents. 5 More importantly, the assertion of
liberty interests on the part of the fetus is premised on a false con-
flict between the liberty interests of parent and fetus. It is the ex-
ception rather than the rule that parents act against the best inter-
ests of their children. It also is counterintuitive to assume that
Genos children, if given the choice, would reject the superiority
that the drug engenders. Banning Genos is not analogous to eradi-
cating the evils of epidemics by vaccination or those of illiteracy by
education. The fundamentally personal decision to endow one's
child with superior traits rests with the parents, not with the
state.16 0
C. The Egalitanian Interests of a Genetically Superior Minority
Versus the Egalitarian Interests of a Genetically Inferior
Majority: Who Would Harm Whom?
1. Could a Genetically Inferior Majority Assert an Interest
in Equality of Opportunity or Equality of Condition?
AEQUUS: The constitutional prohibitions against slavery,
titles of nobility, and denials of equal protection based on race pro-
vide a clear basis for limiting the use of Genos. These prohibitions
set bounds on the amount of inequality that will be tolerated for
the sake of liberty. To say that one can do as one pleases so long as
one does no harm to another merely begs the question: What
counts as "harm"? Libertarianism supplies no means of ensuring
that individuals possess the resources necessary for self-actualiza-
tion-or even survival. Similarly, it provides no basis for redressing
Id. at 103-17, 170-75.
,s Note, 95 Yale L. J. at 605-20 (cited in note 70).
ISO The guidance available from the Supreme Court suggests that it may not impede
important scientific developments in genetics. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980), the Court allowed genetically engineered bacteria to be patented. The Court rejected
policy arguments about "depreciating the value of life," liberally construing the statute to
allow the commercial protection of these products. Id. at 316.
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the inequalities of talent, wealth, and other sources of power occa-
sioned by a phenomenon like Genos-inequalities that easily could
be characterized as "harm." Therefore, even if the use of Genos
does abridge a parental right superior to competing fetal claims, a
compelling state interest still exists to justify prohibiting the drug:
the assault on egalitarian values that Genos would effect implicates
compelling state interests of constitutional stature.16'
Even apart from the maniacal racial purity advocated by the
Nazis, elitist notions have plagued the history of genetic engineer-
ing. Eugenicists have attributed to heredity such qualities as intel-
ligence, industry, and even righteousness. 162 Earlier in this century,
they directly linked many of these faculties to race, ethnicity,
physical handicap, and social class. 63 Inspired by these views, eu-
genic reformers preached a distinctive gospel of social reform.
Fearing that the lower classes were reproducing in greater propor-
tions than the rest of the population, they urged the well-bred to
augment their reproductive activities.16 4 They also reformulated
notions of charity in Darwinian terms: rather than help people to
survive who otherwise would not, charity must help society to bet-
ter itself.16 5 Finally, the eugenic reformers criticized democracy as
a form of government that enabled the ignorant masses to triumph
over more deserving experts.' 6
Genos will exacerbate the distance between social classes dra-
matically and irrevocably. 67 This stratification offends principles
of equality of opportunity and equality of condition, central to
American ideals. Two critical interests in the area of equality of
"I In the past, the Court has permitted state interests to trump individual liberty in-
terests in procreation. See Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983)
(upholding requirements that a second physician be present in a post-viability abortion and
that a pathology report be filed for all abortions); Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (holding that abor-
tion procedures subsequent to fetal viability may be regulated "except when it is necessary
to preserve the life or health of the mother").
162 Sir Francis Galton, who coined the term "eugenics," believed that its aim was to
give to the "more suitable races or strains of blood" a better chance of prevailing speedily
over the "less suitable" than they otherwise would have had. Golding, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at
464 (cited in note 65).
163 Robert Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 Colum.
L. Rev. 1418, 1422-27 (1981).
14 Id. at 1428. See also Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1862 (cited in note 10).
16 Cynkar, 81 Colum. L. Rev. at 1426 (cited in note 163).
166 Id. at 1427. English eugenicists reflected the deeply embedded royalist and aristo-
cratic traditions of eugenic theory. Id. at 1422; Golding, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 465-66 (cited
in note 65). During the 1960s they proposed that the prohibition of polygamy be abrogated
for members of the House of Lords. Gorney, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 295 (cited in note 37).
They also proposed that sperm banks be created with the semen of knights. Id.
16" See Shapiro, 48 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 325 (cited in note 10).
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opportunity are education and employment, 6 8 both of which enjoy
powerful constitutional and statutory protection. 16 9 In construing
the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the critical link between equality of educational opportunity and
equality of employment opportunity. 70 Educational opportunity is
a function of wealth, effort, and intelligence. Because Genos people
will disproportionately possess these resources, the drug will redis-
tribute educational possibilities. This redistribution will be partic-
ularly problematic, since intelligence and effort will (potentially)
be tied permanently to wealth. 171
Beyond formal education, the power to attract scarce re-
sources by virtue of being labeled a Genos person will most likely
continue throughout life.172 Genos people clearly will garner in-
creased influence, 173 achievement, and wealth.17 4 In some instances,
168 Extensive litigation vindicating rights to education and employment indicates the
importance of these areas. See, e.g., Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law at
639-59, 846-49 (cited in note 152); Barbara Schlei and Paul Grossman, Employment Dis-
crimination Law (1979). Equal opportunity in political power is another value that has been
extensively protected against discrimination. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982)
(nullifying racially discriminatory, at-large election districting); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964) (disallowing weighting of votes according to residency and imposing "one person,
one vote" standard for state legislative apportionment); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960) (invalidating racially discriminatory gerrymandering of election district).
109 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (per curiam) (discrimi-
nation in education); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discrimination in employ-
ment). See also Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982 &
Supp. 1985) (enforcing right of equal access to public education); Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985) (enforcing right of equal
access to employment).
170 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 n.16 (1976).
7 Disparities in wealth and natural intelligence coupled with the constitutional right
to educational choice already result in considerable differences in educational opportunity.
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510. Even if these differences do not rise to the level of a constitu-
tional violation, the intervention of Genos will grossly aggravate the inequality they pro-
duce. Genos will concentrate inequalities by capriciously tying intelligence and effort to
wealth. See text at notes 198-200 below.
172 For discussions of the correlation between intelligence and success, including eco-
nomic success, see authorities cited in note 10 above. The economic disadvantages that the
superiority of Genos people will visit on non-Genos people may be aggravated by the per-
ception that Genos people will generally be superior candidates for employment and other
important positions. Rather than make fair individual determinations, employers and others
may find it cheaper to make statistical assumptions that Genos people win prove superior
candidates. See generally Posner, The Economics of Justice at 362-63 (cited in note 4).
Whether Title VII would proscribe such discrimination depends on whether Genos people
are treated as a race within the statute's meaning. See note 203 below (suggesting that dis-
crimination against Genos people may violate Title VII).
17 See text following note 203 below.
174 Because the drug also engenders superior stamina, it will cancel out the effects of
extra effort by non-Genos people. But see Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 312 (cited in note
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disparities in education and employment may be countered with
affirmative action; 17 5 however, the prospect of using this controver-
sial remedy to deal with yet another form of inequality is not at-
tractive. Considering the disagreement that affirmative action has
spawned on the Supreme Court,176 one wonders how this strategy
can be applied to help non-Genos people, who are the overwhelm-
ing majority rather than a minority.177
In addition, Genos will offend constitutional provisions that
protect another fundamental value: equality of condition. The drug
will enthrone a virtually permanent elite. While this effect may not
directly abridge the Constitution as now understood, it clearly will
undercut notions of equality of condition enshrined in the prohibi-
tions against titles of nobility. 7  The Constitution does not envi-
sion the type of aristocracy that Genos people will constitute.1 9
As the nobility clauses erect an upper limit (albeit lenient) on
inequality of condition, the thirteenth amendment enforces a lower
limit by proscribing slavery and involuntary servitude. 80 The thir-
teenth amendment extends to purely private actions such as the
manufacture and use of Genos.' e ' Not long after its ratification, the
8) (arguing that other things being equal, persons with superior natural endowments exhibit
greater effort).
175 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (sustaining congressional pro-
gram of affirmative action in public works); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(approving affirmative action in promotion undertaken by private employers to fulfill obli-
gations under Title VII); University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(approving affirmative action in university admissions in some circumstances).
178 In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote for a "majority of one." 438 U.S. at 267. Fullilove
was decided by a splintered majority that penned three separate opinions, 448 U.S. at 449
(syllabus), and the decision incited two very strong dissents. See id. at 522 (Stewart, J.), 532
(Stevens, J.). Recently, the Court has construed Title VII as granting only a limited power
to the judiciary in ordering affirmative action. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C.,
106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (courts should not use discretion to approve affirmative action simply
to create a racially-balanced workforce); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 106 S. Ct.
1842 (1986) (disallowing affirmative action in layoffs to preserve remedies for past discrimi-
nation where less intrusive means available); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561 (1984) (court cannot extend consent decree affirmative action program to in-
clude affirmative action in layoffs in violation of bona fide seniority system).
177 Even if such a dramatic expansion of affirmative action were feasible, it might im-
pair current aid to those existing minorities who cannot afford the drug.
178 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The nobility clauses, however, would
not literally be violated unless Congress or a state conferred the noble status upon Genos
persons.
179 Still, the prohibitions against titles of nobility are somewhat indeterminate. Note,
94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1858-61 (cited in note 10).
180 U.S. Const. amend. XHI.
181 Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law at 841 (cited in note 152). But see
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 261 (1978) ("in Norwood v. Harrison, the
Court was willing to say no more than that 'some private discrimination is subject to special
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Supreme Court construed the thirteenth amendment broadly to
eradicate not only slavery but all types of involuntary servitude
affecting all persons. 12 Congress is empowered "to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery."1 s Congress is also free to determine rationally what are
"badges and incidents of slavery. . .[and] translate that determi-
nation into effective legislation. 18 4 Congress may easily come to
the conclusion that Genos will produce just such a "badge of slav-
ery." While the drug does not impose a condition of slavery or in-
voluntary servitude in the narrow sense, the drug shackles those
who lack it with an extreme and permanent inferiority that offends
the minimum equality of condition guaranteed by the thirteenth
amendment. 8 5 The inequality caused by Genos, like that imposed
by the institution of slavery, is practically guaranteed to pass from
one generation to the next.188
LIBERTAS: The constitutional principle of equality is much
remedial legislation in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment' "),
quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
"' The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1873). More recently, the Court has
again confirmed that "Congress is authorized under Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment to legislate with regard to 'every race and individual."' McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 288 n.18 (1976) (citations omitted). The legislative history
of the thirteenth amendment sustains this broad reach. Congress intended the amendment,
as enforced by the Civil Rights bill of 1866, to protect all races. G. Sidney Buchanan, The
Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Houston L. Rev. 1,
21 (1974). See also Emily Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments: Constitu-
tional Authority for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex Discrimination, 61 Minn. L.
Rev. 313, 355 (1977); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 11-29 (1955). But compare Note, The Thirteenth Amendment
and Private Affirmative Action, 89 Yale L. J. 399 (1979) (construing legislative history of the
amendment as protecting black persons, but only white persons who were prejudiced by
helping black persons).
183 Jones v. Alfred T. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (emphasis in original).
I'l Id. at 440. Because Jones involved discrimination against black persons, the Court
specifically addressed the historical institution of slavery. As judicial interpretations and the
legislative history make clear, however, Congress's power extends to eradicating any badges
of slavery against all races. See note 182 above.
Although the precise contours of a "badge or incident of slavery" have not yet been
defined, the Supreme Court has held that the concept does comprehend education and em-
ployment, interests implicated by Genos. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 160 (holding that 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and section two of thirteenth amendment apply to private schools); McDon-
ald, 427 U.S. at 273 (Title VII, enacted in part pursuant to section two of thirteenth amend-
ment, protects employment rights of whites as well as non-whites).
I" Like its powers under section five of the fourteenth amendment, Congress's powers
under section two of the thirteenth amendment to enforce and extend its substantive guar-
antee may be extremely broad, see notes 253-61 and accompanying text below. However,
they may have to be balanced against competing constitutional claims enforced by the
courts. See notes 245-52 and accompanying text below.
"' See note 198 below.
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abused because it is much misunderstood. Equality of opportunity
and absolute equality are two very different notions, but they often
are confused.18 7 The latter is in conflict with the constitutional
principle of personal liberty; the former is not. To give the consti-
tutional guarantee of personal liberty real value, it is necessary to
remove legal barriers to achievement so that all stand on a level
playing field. This is equality of opportunity. Absolute equality
robs citizens of the benefits of true liberty: the right to be different
must include the right to use one's own resources to be "better off"
in the eyes of some others. Equality of opportunity may affirm that
all women and men are equal in their legal rights, but it does not
pretend that they are equal in their natural endowments. Absolute
equality would fight natural differences and, in the extreme, make
all citizens the same-and thereby make liberty nothing but a
hollow platitude. Further, notions of absolute equality are inher-
ently indeterminate: while it is possible to put objective limits
upon state-imposed inequality, there is no clear line to be drawn
when one attempts to limit the effects of differences in natural
ability."' 8
Our constitution embraces equality of opportunity, not abso-
lute equality."8" The parts of the Constitution embodying this prin-
ciple focus on inequality imposed or enforced by the state, not on
inequality caused by nature. These provisions eliminate vestiges of
slavery, prohibit aristocracies, and protect discrete and insular mi-
norities that are "left out" of the majoritarian political process.
Genos does not violate any of these constitutional principles. Nor
does it indirectly infringe any of the egalitarian values that these
principles embody.
187 In fact, the notions of removing legal barriers and of equalizing natural potential
could be seen as two types of equality of opportunity, types that Aequus's argument con-
flates. Equalizing natural potential actually moves toward absolute equality.
18 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982). In-
deed, in a representative democracy, it may be impossible to eliminate all state-imposed
inequality of condition; the "representatives" in such a system necessarily enjoy more politi-
cal "clout" than do ordinary citizens, despite the ideal that citizens are to have equal politi-
cal power. It is only in idealized "town meeting" democracy or the Aristotelian city state
that this inequality would not exist.
18' For example, James Madison stated that "the protection of different and unequal
faculties of acquiring property" is "the first object of government." The Federalist Papers
(No. 10) at 78 (New American Library ed. 1961). Most of the founders thought that liberty,
including the liberty to benefit from superior talents, was among the rights that formed the
basis for equality; they might have considered it ironic to call for liberty's sacrifice in the
name of equality. For an elaboration of the view that the Constitution was centrally con-
cerned with preserving the fruits of those with superior natural abilities, see Forrest Mc-
Donald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (1985).
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Genos does not violate the thirteenth amendment. While the
amendment may apply to private action like the development and
use of Genos, 9 ° it may currently protect only black persons, as
only their disabilities could be traced to institutional slavery.19
Even a broader interpretation of the thirteenth amendment-as
encompassing any condition of involuntary servitude-would not
render Genos offensive to it. 92 The drug does not impose involun-
tary servitude on anyone: it is equally available to all who can af-
ford it.
The nobility clauses prohibit the government from conferring
titles of nobility; they do not proscribe private action or natural
superiority. Indeed, the history of these clauses evinces that they
may have been intended to protect developments like Genos.
While the more egalitarian framers may have supported the
clauses to prevent domination by particular families, others in-
tended them to ensure that a state-imposed aristocracy based on
wealth or position would not impede the ascendancy of persons
with greater abilities.""' Of course, the opportunity to use Genos
does depend on ability to pay, but the Constitution permits differ-
entiation based on wealth. The Court repeatedly has refused to
hold that the poor are a "suspect class": it has held that poor peo-
ple do not have a constitutional right to welfare"" or to a particu-
lar level of education. 19
2. Will a Genetically Superior Minority or a Genetically
Inferior Majority be Unable to Protect Its Interests in the
Majoritarian Political Process?
AEQUUS: Insofar as Genos does not directly offend the
equal protection clause and the nobility clauses, Congress may still
invoke the policies underlying these clauses to fashion compelling
190 Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law at 841 (cited in note 152).
' Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 1294, 1308 (1969). The disabilities need not have been directly connected to the histor-
ical institution of slavery, however. Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law at 844
(cited in note 152).
"I1 Even the most liberal interpretation of the thirteenth amendment as proscribing
"second class citizenship" would only proscribe "conditions that could reasonably be called
symptoms of a slave society, inability to raise a family with dignity caused by unemploy-
ment, poor schools and housing, and lack of a place in the body politic." Note, Jones v.
Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 Colum.
L. Rev. 1019, 1025-26 (1969). The Court has left open the question of whether section one of
the thirteenth amendment by its own operation does anything more than prohibit slavery
and involuntary servitude. Consider City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 128-29 (1981).
193 Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. at 1858-61 (cited in note 10).
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
", San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1973).
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state interests to ban the drug. Avoiding Genos's assault on the
values embodied in the equal protection clause is a compelling
state interest. Since Justice Stone's footnote four in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment has been read primarily to protect "discrete
and insular minorities" from abuses of their interests by the politi-
cal process. 198 Traditional equal protection theory suggests that
majorities do not require constitutional protection, as they can
protect themselves through the political process. Also, conven-
tional equal protection jurisprudence permits discrimination based
on actual ability.19 7
Genos, however, contradicts this accepted wisdom. In essence,
it transforms wealth discrimination into a form of racial discrimi-
nation.9 8 Moreover, although those who lack the drug will form a
political majority, this group's tremendous disadvantage in natural
ability will render it more analogous to an insular minority than to
a ruling majority. Discrimination predicated on actual differences
in ability caused by Genos may be more pernicious than arbitrary
distinctions whose injustice is easily perceived. Genos undercuts
-- 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
1 See generally Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
18 Genetically-engineered animals should be regarded as "new species." See note 46
and accompanying text above. Genetically-engineered people would be at least as "differ-
ent" as are the different races of human beings, perhaps more so. A standard anthropologi-
cal definition for race is "[a] major division of mankind, with distinctive, hereditarily trans-
missible characteristics, e.g., Negroid, Mongoloid, and Caucasoid races." Charles Winick,
Dictionary of Anthropology 448 (1958).
Genos people by definition have different characteristics. We do not know whether
these characteristics are hereditarily transmissible or if pharmacological intervention is re-
quired to produce a Genos child in each new generation. Whether Genos is hereditary will
depend on whether it affects the germ line. President's Commission at 42 (cited in note 10).
Genos may affect the germ line if it is administered during the first several weeks of preg-
nancy. Id. at 42-48; Hearings at 191-92 (cited in note 38) (testimony of Alexander Capron,
Executive Director, President's Commission). If Genos is hereditary, stopping its
spread-even if only experimental Genos people exist-may require draconian measures.
For simplicity, then, let us assume that Genos is not hereditary. It remains "transmissible,"
however, because Genos people will have sufficient wealth to purchase the drug for their
children and will likely wish to do so.
Another common definition even more clearly marks Genos people as a different "race":
"a breeding group with gene organization differing from that of other intraspecies groups."
Winick, Anthropology at 448 (cited in this note). The essence of being a Genos person is
being bred to have a different genetic structure. "[C]riteria for determining whether charac-
teristics are racial include hereditary transmission, comparative unalterability, lack of varia-
bility from external causes, and comparative independence of age and sex." Id. Again, with
the possible exception of hereditary transmission, Genos people would possess all of the
characteristics necessary to mark them as a distinctive race. With respect to the lack of




most of the traditional reasons given for the moral acceptance of
rewards based on superior ability-in particular, exertion of effort
and uncontrollable luck in heredity. Genos rewards existing wealth
with fantastic ability and the potential to realize even more
wealth. 199 With increasing wealth will come increasing political
power. The morally arbitrary nature of this spiral of success may
understandably kindle feelings of envy or resentment among the
majority that lacks the drug.200
Nevertheless, there may be little the non-Genos majority can
do outside the political arena to counteract the disadvantages en-
sured by the drug. Concerted refusal to deal with the Genos minor-
ity may have significant redistributive effects in favor of non-Ge-
nos people.201 But ad hoc, private discrimination against Genos
people will be discouraged by practical economics: Genos people
will be valuable assets to most enterprises. 202 In addition to the
myriad practical difficulties with private efforts to discriminate
against Genos people, the current legal system disfavors the requi-
site collusive practices and may also bar private employment dis-
1 Indeed, due to preexisting deprivations, traditional minorities may disproportion-
ately populate the non-Genos stratum. In contrast to existing types of discrimination, that
spawned by Genos may irreversibly subordinate minorities. Just as economically disadvan-
taged members of traditional minorities are not constitutionally entitled to welfare or a cer-
tain quality of education, likely they also are not entitled to Genos. See Dandridge, 397 U.S.
at 485 (holding that the poor are not a suspect class and that they have no constitutional
right to welfare); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 22-23 (poor have no right to particular quality of
education).
200 John Rawls excuses envy engendered by a relative imbalance in the distribution of
"primary goods." Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 62 (cited in note 8). He also contrasts envy
with resentment, which "is a moral feeling. If we resent our having less than others, it must
be because we think that their being better off is the result of unjust institutions or wrong-
ful conduct on their part." Id. at 533. Accordingly, one might conclude that because superior
ability may result naturally as well as from Genos effects, the drug gives no cause for resent-
ment. But the metamorphosis effectuated by Genos is singularly dramatic and most likely
permanent.
,01 For example, the redistributive impact of concerted racial discrimination disadvan-
tages the black minority. Posner, The Economics of Justice at 355 (cited in note 4).
202 Judge Richard Posner notes that refusing to do business with a particular group
due to racial or other discrimination places a firm at a competitive disadvantage compared
to firms who do not so discriminate. Id. at 351-52. Of course, if the firm would lose more
business-in particular, that of the racial majority-for shunning discrimination, it might
refuse to deal with the minority. However, refusals to deal with enormously able Genos
people may prove far more expensive than refusals to deal with more typical individuals.
Aside from the potential legal and practical problems of enforcing agreements against hiring
these economically advantageous people, the threat that Genos people will establish their
own, more productive businesses may deter such agreements. To avert such developments,
collusion against Genos people would have to extend to almost all business dealings. If Ge-
nos people were excluded from the domestic marketplace, they might just move to more
hospitable counties.
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crimination against them.203
Political action thus may be the majority's only adequate de-
fense against Genos. Progressive taxation might be used to recap-
ture some of the wealth that Genos people garner. But if the politi-
cal power of Genos people is commensurate with their wealth and
ability, this remedy also may be difficult. Any regulation that dis-
counts the interests of Genos people may encounter stiff opposi-
tion in a government in which they are amply represented. The
sway that Genos public officials could give to their electorates will
make them attractive candidates. Once Genos people occupy the
elected or appointed corridors of power, they may be there to stay.
The only means of shielding the majority from this menace of per-
manent status as a economic and political underclass is to stop the
stratification before it comes into being-by banning Genos.
But legislation restricting Genos or Genos people poses thorny
fourteenth amendment problems. If majoritarian political action
against Genos people were to succeed, legislation aimed against
them would present the Supreme Court with a Hobson's choice:
condoning such laws would sanction a kind of genetic apartheid,
while invalidating them would leave the majority defenseless to
protect itself.
The problem is difficult but not impossible to resolve. Genos
people possess some of the classic characteristics of a suspect class:
they are a minority, and by assumption, they possess immutable
physical characteristics that render them discrete to facilitate dis-
crimination.0 4 Importantly, these same immutable differences like-
203 If they are directed at changing the social, political, or economic structure, boycotts
against Genos people may receive constitutional protection. See NAACP v. Clairborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Prosser & Keeton at 1025-26 (cited in note 116). If the
purpose of the boycott is to garner competitive advantage in the marketplace, however, the
doctrine of concerted refusal to deal will likely provide causes of action under both antitrust
and tort. Id. at 1013-15, 1023-26; Lawrence Antony Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Anti-
trust 261-65 (1977). Boycotts in which the business competitors of Genos people participate
will likely fall into the prohibited category. Prosser & Keeton at 1024-26 (cited in note 116);
Sullivan, Antitrust at 261-62 (cited in this note). Incidentally, some of these protections
would also proscribe collusion among Genos people both in their business practices and in
any attempts to limit sales of Genos to transactions between each other.
Further, Title VII remedies for race discrimination could conceivably be applied to Ge-
nos people, see John B. Attanasio, Equal Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of Sex-
ual Discrimination, 51 Cin. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.14 (1982) (Title VII indicates a broad, remedial
purpose), and would proscribe discriminating against Genos people in matters of employ-
ment. Carving out a statutory exception to permit discrimination against Genos people may
be unconstitutional.
214 Even if they did not possess distinguishing physical characteristics, discrimination
could readily proceed against Genos people. Their mental and physical capabilities would
clearly reveal their identity.
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wise mark non-Genos people as a discrete group, if not a minority.
While Genos people obviously cannot demonstrate a history of dis-
crimination, 20 5 such a history might quickly evolve if Congress and
state legislatures begin enacting restrictions against them. On the
other hand, if Genos people become politically powerful, they
might soon enact laws that may adversely affect the non-Genos
majority. °8 Thus, the question is whether Genos people or non-
Genos people are most like a "discrete and insular minority."
The possibility of declaring Genos people a suspect class poses
a perplexing question: does the law afford special protection to a
group that has vast inherent superiority? The Court likely would
protect a traditional racial or ethnic group even though statistics
revealed a stunning history of success.
If the fourteenth amendment is construed to protect Genos
people against political action by the non-Genos majority, this will
strip the non-Genos majority of any hope of political remedies
against domination by the superior minority. The ultimate para-
dox of Genos then will be to reduce the majority to the political
equivalent of a discrete and insular minority. Once the drug is pro-
duced, non-Genos people will practically and constitutionally be
unable to protect themselves through the political process. Conse-
quently, the majority must be allowed to protect itself by banning
the drug while it still can. These egalitarian interests should not be
ignored simply because non-Genos people will constitute a major-
ity: witness the fourteenth amendment protection of women. 07
Alternatively, the Court might acknowledge the egalitarian in-
terests of the non-Genos majority by treating as suspect all racial
classifications-even if they operate against a political majority.
Justice Powell's swing opinion in University of California Regents
v. Bakke20 8 rejected purposeful race-based discrimination in educa-
203 A history of discrimination probably is required to trigger heightened equal protec-
tion scrutiny. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. For example, the history of discrimination
against women in large part has led to heightened scrutiny of gender-based classifications.
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-88 (1973).
However, while a group might not qualify for the strongest equal protection guarantees
unless it can show a history of discrimination, the equal protection clause demands that any
classification be based at a minimum on a rational relation to a permissible state purpose.
See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group is impermissible).
'0' Laws against the non-Genos majority may not directly discriminate against it as
much as legally protect the natural advantages afforded by the drug.
207 See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744-45 (1984) (subjecting gender dis-
crimination to heightened scrutiny).
208 438 U.S. 265, 269-320 (1978). Justice Powell would permit affirmative action in
some cases on first amendment grounds of educational diversity. Id. at 311-15. However, he
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tion, even where it operates against the white majority to redress
the continuing inequities that black persons endure. Use of Genos
will disadvantage the non-Genos majority for purposes far less
worthy than redressing the deep disadvantages of black persons. 209
Plyler v. Doe210 suggests yet another equal protection interest that
the Court may find compelling: avoiding the creation of a subclass
or "caste" in American society.211 Those who lack Genos could be-
come just such a permanent underclass.
LIBERTAS: Footnote four of Carolene Products suggests
the equal protection clause focuses on protecting discrete and insu-
lar minorities, not majorities like non-Genos people.21 2 Moreover,
the mandates of the equal protection clause are activated only if
there is both state action 213 and discriminatory purpose.21 4 Private
corporations manufacture Genos. They presumably do so to make
profits and not for the purpose of increasing the inequalities in so-
ciety. Individuals likewise choose to use Genos to make themselves
better off, not necessarily to make others (absolutely or relatively)
worse off.
Non-Genos people lack most of the distinguishing characteris-
joined in striking down the quota at issue in Bakke. Id. at 315-20.
209 Affirmative action for historically deprived minorities could still pass even the strict
scrutiny test because rectifying a particular history of discrimination constitutes a compel-
ling state interest. There are also other rationales for upholding affirmative action. See Ful-
lilove, 448 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring) (section two of the thirteenth amendment and
section five of the fourteenth amendment); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15 (first amendment in-
terest in educational diversity). Nonetheless, affording majorities constitutional protection
against racial discrimination can adversely affect minorities. For example, in Wygant, 106 S.
Ct. at 1842, Powell wrote for a plurality of four Justices in striking down an affirmative
action plan. He rejected the plan because it operated without any finding that the individu-
als benefited had personally suffered from discrimination and because the plan gave prefer-
ences to blacks in layoffs, which was regarded as more intrusive than preferential hiring. Id.
at 1849.
210 457 U.S 202 (1982).
211 Id. at 213, 223. Two concurring opinions also expressed fears concerning the crea-
tion of a subclass of illiterate, illegal immigrants. Id. at 233 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 238-
39 (Powell, J., concurring). For two interesting caste analyses of racial discrimination not
specifically pertaining to the Plyler context, see Paul R. Dimond, The Anti-Caste Princi-
ple-Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of Race Cases, 30 Wayne L. Rev. 1
(1983); Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 107
(1976).
212 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
21' Shapiro, 48 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 367-68 (cited in note 10). Since that article was writ-
ten, the Court has considerably narrowed the definition of state action. See, e.g., Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (no state action for state-imposed penalties for alleged failure
to effect medically appropriate releases from nursing homes); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830 (1982) (no state action for employee discharge from extensively regulated private
school when state did not specifically regulate school's employment practices).
214 See, e.g., Washington, 426 U.S. at 229.
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tics of discrete and insular minorities. First, they form a substan-
tial political majority. The Constitution does not guard the egalita-
rian interests of a majority that can defend itself in the political
process. It is more credible to think that it is the Genos people who
will need constitutional protection from the political actions of the
majority-actions such as attempts to eradicate them by banning
Genos. Plyler, Bakke, and the gender discrimination cases all man-
ifest some ambivalence about affording countermajoritarian pro-
tection to a popular majority even when there has been a history of
discrimination. For example, the Court has subjected gender-based
classifications to "heightened," not "strict," scrutiny;215 and a ma-
jority of the Court has never accepted Justice Powell's conclusion
in Bakke that even classifications disadvantaging the racial major-
ity are subject to strict scrutiny.2 16
Second, non-Genos people as a group obviously have not al-
ready experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment, nor
have they been stereotyped to mask their true abilities.217 Plyler,
Bakke, and the gender discrimination cases all turn on clear evi-
dence of past discrimination."1 $ In contrast, the supposed
powerlessness of non-Genos people is pure speculation, and specu-
lative harms do not provide a sound constitutional basis for invok-
ing the power of the state to constrain free choice. It is, for exam-
ple, hard to believe that the non-Genos majority ever would face
disadvantages comparable to those faced by black persons
throughout American history, or by the children of illegal immi-
grants in Plyler.
Third, any advantages that the non-Genos majority suffers rel-
ative to Genos people will be based on actual ability-unlike the
disadvantages imposed on racial or ethnic groups, or on women.219
Some discrimination in favor of Genos people is both inevitable
and good; recognizing and rewarding the use of their superior capa-
bilities will benefit all of society. Further, Genos people may them-
"5 See generally Attanasio, 72 Geo. L. Rev. at 1689 (cited in note 66).
216 Only Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny to classifications disadvantaging groups
that were not discrete and insular minorities. 438 U.S. at 287-305. In Fullilove v. Kiutznick,
the dissents of Justices Stewart and Stevens embrace the view that the equal protection
clause is color blind, so that classifications disadvantaging whites are treated no more favor-
ably than classifications disadvantaging blacks. 448 U.S. at 522 (Stewart, J.), 532 (Stevens,J.).
*) Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
218 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 677; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360-61 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law at 713-14
(cited in note 152); Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 1060 (cited in note 181).
21 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
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selves mitigate any problems produced by their superior status: the
well-off generally have a rational self-interest in alleviating ine-
quality by redistributing some of the increased resources they
generate.22
0
Compelling state interests cannot rest on speculation. After
Genos becomes available, a long period of time will elapse before a
sound determination can be made that the harm the drug produces
sufficiently outweighs its benefits to create a compelling state in-
terest in controlling its use.
3. Can Congressional Powers to Safeguard Both Libertarian
and Egalitarian Values Avert a Collision of Constitutional
Principles?
AEQUUS: Congress has powers to broaden the scope of
traditional fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. Even if egalitar-
ian arguments asserted against Genos do not reflect constitutional
mandates that the judiciary is bound to enforce, Congress can ex-
pand the constitutional demand of equality by exercising its pow-
ers under section five of the fourteenth amendment.221 Signifi-
cantly, the Supreme Court has recently indicated that Congress
can apply section five of the fourteenth- amendment to prohibit
discrimination that is not purposeful.222 Moreover, Congress can
invoke this power to regulate purely private conduct. In United
States v. Guest,22s six Justices specifically stated that section five
empowered Congress to regulate purely private conduct.224 The
Court reaffirmed this principle in District of Columbia v. Carter.-225
While declaring that, on its face, the fourteenth amendment does
not regulate private conduct, the Court added this caveat: "This is
220 Posner, The Economics of Justice at 89-90 (cited in note 4).
221 "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the pro-
visions of this article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. The Supreme Court has held that
Congress cannot use its section five power to dilute the scope of constitutional protections.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). Accordingly, section five would not empower Con-
gress directly to countermand a judicial holding that Genos violates the guarantee of liberty.
Congress possibly could recognize a countervailing equal protection interest against Ge-
nos-although it is not clear how that interest should be balanced against the liberty inter-
est, if any, in taking the drug.
122 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980) (dispensing with the
requirement of discriminatory intent for congressional legislation under section two of the
fifteenth amendment and analogizing this to cases decided under section five of the four-
teenth amendment). See also Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476-77 (plurality opinion for two mem-
bers of the Court).
223 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
22 Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring), 782-84 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
225 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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not to say, of course, that Congress may not proscribe purely pri-
vate conduct under the fourteenth amendment.
'226
The section five power appears to be broad enough to allow
Congress to declare that the manufacture of Genos violates equal
protection. In particular, section five allows Congress broad power
to remedy violations of Court-declared equality interests and to
define new classes of equality interests. In Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan,227 the Supreme Court held that section five empowers Con-
gress to designate and proscribe conduct as violative of equal pro-
tection, even if that conduct has not been identified as a violation
by the courts. The uncontroversial part of the Morgan holding is
that Congress is empowered to enforce equal protection require-
ments that the Court already has identified-for example, the
guarantee against racial and ethnic discrimination. Thus, the Court
recognized congressional authority to determine that the right to
vote would endow Puerto Ricans with the necessary political power
to overcome discrimination against them in governmental ser-
vices. 228 Deference to Congress in making this judgment is
exceptional.229
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick230 likewise gives Congress broad discretion as to how to en-
force those equal protection mandates that the Court has already
established.3 1 Significantly, the Chief Justice's opinion also per-
mits Congress to forestall prospective infringements on the guar-
antee of equal protection by allowing remedial measures to apply
to new programs, in which findings of specific past discrimination
"I" Id. at 424 n.8 (emphasis added). See also Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 91, 114 (1966) (arguing that modem conditions and political philosophy re-
quire that section five empower Congress affirmatively to advance "material welfare and
human rights").
2, 384 U.S. 641, 652-56 (1966) (upholding federal legislation prohibiting state-imposed
English literacy requirements that impeded the right of Puerto Rican citizens to vote).
2 Id. at 652-53.
1 "It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of [the various conflicting]
factors." Id. at 653. Archibald Cox notes that the Morgan decision lacks even token qualify-
ing phrases on Congress' judgment such as "rational." Cox, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 104 (cited in
note 226).
:30 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
31 Congress, after due consideration, perceived a pressing need to move forward with
new approaches in the continuing effort to achieve the goal of equality of economic
opportunity. In this effort, Congress has necessary latitude to try new techniques...
to accomplish remedial objectives.
448 U.S. at 490 (1980).
1986] 1319
The University of Chicago Law Review
obviously are impossible." 2 In this connection, Congress could sim-
ply predicate its remedial measures on the general history of dis-
crimination against the various minorities involved.
The racial discrimination that Genos spawns2 33 is at the heart
of judicially established equal protection interests. Consequently,
Morgan enables Congress to act based on its speculations about
the drug's possible effects, and Fullilove allows projections about
the drug even though it is a new development.
The irreversibility of the Genos decision requires that Con-
gress be given this authority at an early stage. Although Congress
lacks a specific history of discrimination fostered by Genos upon
which to predicate its conclusions, it does possess ample experience
with discrimination against minorities and majorities (affirmative
action and gender discrimination) with which to evaluate the drug.
Considering the painful and ignominious experience our nation has
had with other forms of discrimination, Congress should be able to
avert the creation of new suspect classifications involving race.
Another part of the Morgan holding goes beyond empowering
Congress to remedy categories of equal protection violations de-
clared by the Court: it recognizes Congress's authority to designate
new categories of equal protection violations in addition to those
that the Court has established. Indeed, the Court in Morgan held
that Congress could determine-independent of racial discrimina-
tion and despite a prior contrary holding by the Court-that Eng-
lish literacy tests were a per se violation of the equal protection
clause.23 4 On this point, the Court simply opined: "We perceive a
basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment that the
application of New York's English literacy requirement. . . consti-
tuted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. '23 5
Invoking this authority, Congress could ban Genos as a viola-
tion of equal protection, and a reviewing court could easily "per-
ceive a basis" for this legislative determination. Congress reasona-
bly could conclude that the use of Genos by the rich will
232 Id. at 480-81.
I's Genos-based discrimination can be seen as race discrimination. See note 198 and
accompanying text above.
234 384 U.S at 653-56. See also Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law at
834-35 (cited in note 152).
235 384 U.S. at 656. Finding the second part of Morgan's holding "a strikingly novel
form of judicial deference to congressional power," Archibald Cox construes it as holding
that "Congress may decide, within broad limits, how the general principle of equal protec-
tion applies to actual conditions." Cox, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 106 (cited in note 226).
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perpetuate and exacerbate the disadvantage suffered by the poor
and that such inequality can be remedied under section five. Alter-
natively, it could also conclude that the drug will engender a new
divisive form of racial separation.
LIBERTAS: Congress's power under section five of the four-
teenth amendment is not a blank check. Section five does not ap-
ply to purely private conduct. In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,36
the Supreme Court explicitly held that the fourteenth amendment
does not confer upon Congress the power to regulate private con-
duct. Guest does not suggest that Congress could invoke section
five to regulate all private conduct: the particular conduct at issue
in that case interfered with the exercise of public rights. 37 Thus, if
it permits Congress to regulate private conduct at all, section five
only permits regulation of private conduct that specifically inter-
feres with the exercise of public rights. Genos involves no such
interference.
Even granting that section five might allow congressional regu-
lation of private conduct, Morgan does not eliminate the require-
ment that Congress have some evidence of past discrimination to
act against private conduct (although the case may relax the re-
quirement somewhat). Such evidence was the basis for applying
Morgan's rationale in Fullilove.2 3 8 Morgan and Fullilove may allow
Congress to act to forestall prospective discrimination in new pro-
grams without an extensive record of past discrimination. " But
this does not suggest that Congress can act without any evidence
of discrimination. Even if discrimination against non-Genos per-
sons qualifies as racial discrimination, Congress will be entitled to
act against Genos only when some such discrimination actually
occurs.
240
While the powers Morgan gives to Congress may extend to
identifying and remedying equal protection violations by the
states, they do not necessarily permit Congress to define new cate-
gories of equal protection. The limits on congressional power were
made clear in Oregon v. Mitchell, in which the Court allowed Con-
2-0 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883) (section two of the thirteenth amendment can regulate purely
private conduct, but section five can only counteract and afford relief against state regula-
tions or proceedings). See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
231 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 273-74 (cited in note 181). The specific
conduct involved in Guest was interference with the exercise of fourteenth amendment
rights.
238 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476.
239 Id. at 476-78.
240 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 657-58.
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gress to use section five to lower the minimum voting age for fed-
eral elections, but not for state elections.24 1 In Mitchell, four Jus-
tices specifically rejected the power of Congress to define the
substantive requirements of equal protection.24 2 This conclusion
conforms with the principle of separation of powers: it must be the
Court, not Congress, which ultimately interprets the equal protec-
tion clause.243 Since Mitchell, the Court has not allowed Congress
independently to define equal protection.2 4 Were Congress to at-
tempt to redefine the scope of the equal protection clause in order
to ban Genos, it could not claim that its actions were immune from
judicial review.
Further, when congressional action against Genos is reviewed
by the courts, Congress's justifications need not be given great def-
erence. The regulation of Genos may place the fourteenth amend-
ment command of equal protection in direct conflict with the prin-
ciples of individual liberty embodied in the same amendment.
Even if Congress can posit a credible egalitarian interest against
Genos, -it may not abrogate the fourteenth amendment liberty in-
terest in taking the drug.245 What results is a collision between
"liberty" as it is recognized and protected by the countermajori-
tarian Court and "equality" as defined by the majoritarian
legislature.
Which body has ultimate responsibility for the resolution of
this tension? Notwithstanding any power Congress might possess
under section five of the fourteenth amendment, the judiciary is
the final arbiter of the Constitution; legislatures cannot make laws
241 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
242 Id. at 293-96 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 201-09
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally Samuel Estreicher,
Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life"
Legislation, 68 Va. L. Rev. 333, 426-38 (1982). Casting the deciding vote in Mitchell, Justice
Black resolved the case on the narrow ground that the Constitution specifically empowers
the states to regulate their own elections. 400 U.S. at 124-30.
243 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
244 Estreicher, 68 Va. L. Rev. at 438 (cited in note 242). Recently, four dissenting Jus-
tices in E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) rejected the use of the section five power
to apply age discrimination proscriptions against the states. Citing Murgia, 427 U.S. at 307,
and Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), these Justices noted that the Court had declared
age discrimination beyond the pale of the equal protection clause. 460 U.S. at 259-63 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting). The plurality rested Congress's authority to enact such proscriptions
on the commerce clause and declined to address whether the legislation could be upheld
under section five. Id. at 243 & n.18.
245 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 732, which cited Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10, and con-
cluded that Congress may enforce, but not dilute, the equal protection guarantee. The con-
clusion suggests that Congress likewise may not define equal protection so as to dilute the
guarantee of individual liberty.
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that fly in the face of the Court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.' 4' The Court cannot foresake individual rights by deferring to
the majoritarian legislative process.2 47 The judiciary can and
should resolve the conflict, removed from political gales and in a
reasoned fashion. 4 8 Justice Robert Jackson proclaimed:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversey [sic], to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamen-
tal rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.
24 9
The Court has resolved conflicts between liberty and equality
before. With Genos, the only real problem is unequal access to the
drug based on wealth, but wealth disparities count for little in con-
stitutional jurisprudence. 250 The Court historically has rejected
claims based on economic inequality when faced with competing
liberty claims.2 51 For example, when Congress passed legislation
limiting campaign expenditures in order to equalize access to polit-
ical candidacy, the Court invalidated the limits on the ground that
they infringed on the first amendment liberty to speak. 52
AEQUUS: Oregon v. Mitchell does not repudiate Congress's
authority to construe and expand the equal protection guarantee;
on the contrary, the decision reaffirms that authority. Four Jus-
tices clearly approved Congress's discretion in this area, 53 and the
pivotal opinion of Justice Black substantially upheld it.2 54 Because
240 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
M David A. J. Richards, Taking Taking Rights Seriously Seriously: Reflections on
Dworkin and the American Revival of Natural Law, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265, 1328 (1977).
:45 See Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt, Tragic Choices 67 (1978).
249 West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
255 The Court has refused to recognize poor people as constituting a suspect class and
has rejected the notion that citizens have a right to welfare. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485. It
has also rejected the claims of poor women that a state may not refuse to fund abortions
when it provides funding for other medical services. Maher, 432 U.S. at 471-74.
'51 See notes 6-7 above; Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law at 731-34
(cited in note 152).
'5 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-59 (per curiam).
253 400 U.S. at 141-44 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 246-49
(Brennan, J., White, J., and Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
M'5 Since Congress has attempted to invade an area preserved to the States by the Con-
stitution without a foundation for enforcing the Civil War Amendments' ban on racial
discrimination, I would hold that Congress has exceeded its powers in attempting to
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the effects of Genos will foster racial discrimination and because
regulation of medical technology is not exclusively reserved to the
states (thus avoiding the federalism problems Justice Black saw in
Mitchell,) the Court should uphold congressional authority to ban
the drug under section five.
Institutional considerations also argue in favor of a congres-
sional prerogative to define the scope of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Institutional constraints may impede the federal courts from
enforcing constitutional norms to their fullest extent. To compen-
sate for this judicial underenforcement, Congress is rightly empow-
ered to push constitutional guarantees to their limit. 5  Unlike the
Court, Congress need neither articulate principles nor adhere to
precedent.256 Moreover, Congress can make pragmatic distinctions
that may be "either rough or finely tuned." 57 Congress's superior
fact-finding ability allows it to define new categories of equal pro-
tection violations,258 as well as to remedy violations previously de-
fined by the Court. Even if the egalitarian interests implicated by
Genos are not readily cognizable under traditional equal protection
theory, 59 the myriad concerns that Genos raises make deference to
Congress's decisionmaking ability particularly appropriate. 60
Conflict between libertarian and egalitarian values in the four-
teenth amendment need not always be resolved in favor of per-
sonal liberty. For example, the Supreme Court has allowed the
lower the voting age in state and local elections. On the other hand, where Congress
legislates in a domain not exclusively reserved by the Constitution to the States, its
enforcement power need not be tied so closely to the goal of eliminating discrimination
on account of race.
Id. at 130.
255 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1239-40 (1978). Sager would not permit congressional
enforcement to undercut constitutional norms propounded by the Court. Id. at 1240. How-
ever, Genos is a novel issue ranging well beyond established norms.
2.6 Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganic Marriage, 1969 S. Ct. Rev. 81,
112.
M5 Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (1975).
25S Cox, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 107 (cited in note 226).
259 See notes 204-11 and accompanying text above.
260 See Irving A. Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power Under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 N.W.
U. L. Rev. 656, 699 (1977):
[F]ederal courts probably do not have the fact-finding machinery and the expertise to
cope with [the far reaching consequences of imponderables like school financing re-
forms] as thoroughly and comprehensively as another branch of the government, and
... the solutions of some of these problems require difficult and perhaps inconsistent




government to subordinate the liberty interests in free exercise of
religion and free association to egalitarian goals of racial and gen-
der integration.6 1
D. Alternative Distribution Schemes: Are There Less Restrictive
Means of Satisfying Egalitarian Interests?
LIBERTAS: Even if the Court decides with respect to Genos
that egalitarian interests outweigh liberty interests, Congress nev-
ertheless has only limited discretion to choose the means of regu-
lating Genos. Egalitarian restrictions on Genos implicate funda-
mental personal and reproductive liberties and constitute
preemptive discrimination that would eliminate a future race. In
light of these important liberty interests, Congress must prove that
the limits it places on Genos are the least restrictive means neces-
sary to effectuate its egalitarian ends. 2 '
Means far short of an absolute ban may be sufficient to meet
egalitarian ends. In fact, it may prove not to be so difficult for the
average person to pay to receive Genos. If the drug does produce
people of superior capacity, it will produce superior economic per-
formance. Lenders will find it profitable to provide funds to those
who could not otherwise afford Genos if, through its use, the bor-
rowers' offspring have particular promise. When that promise
bears fruit, Genos offspring will be able to use their increased earn-
ings to pay off the loans required to augment their productive
potential.
Such a system of private selection and funding of Genos users
may prove to be more accurate than government regulation in
targeting those members of American society-from among both
the advantaged and the disadvantaged-who will profit most from
the use of Genos. The free market may not only be more efficient
than regulation at selecting those who should have access to the
limited supply of Genos; it may be more equitable as well. Govern-
ment agencies often are "captured" by special interests that sub-
vert the interests of the general public and use government control
161 Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 604 (upholding IRS denial of tax deductions to
racially discriminatory religious university); Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175-76 (racial integration
takes precedence over free association rights of private school students and their parents);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609 (ordering men's association to admit women to membership, in the
face of free association claim).
2 Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 1000-01 (cited in note 181). Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), is the rare example when the Court has sustained gov-
ernment regulations based on an explicit racial or ethnic classification. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law at 1000.
1986] 1325
1326 The University of Chicago Law Review [53:1274
as their own special sword and shield.6s
If the private market fails to produce an efficient or fair distri-
bution of Genos, very limited government intervention may ad-
dress whatever problems remain. The government could allow the
market generally to- allocate the drug but could subsidize its use
directly among the poor. Alternatively, the government itself could
distribute Genos among potential users, charging prices that vary
according to wealth.2 ' Direct subsidies or egalitarian distribution
of Genos by the government also would mitigate long-run concerns
about propagating an elitist class system. Genos persons dispersed
among various economic and social classes would have the oppor-
tunity to help others of their group.
Even these limited egalitarian distribution schemes will impair
fundamental liberty rights. Because Genos is in limited supply,
some who could afford the drug will not receive it. The deprivation
of the liberty of these people must be kept to the minimum truly
necessary to accommodate actual egalitarian interests.265
AEQUUS: When it acts under section five of the fourteenth
amendment, Congress need not show that its regulation of Genos is
no more restrictive than necessary to effectuate egalitarian inter-
ests.2 6 Even if this were a requirement, banning Genos altogether
may be the only feasible means of protecting the egalitarian inter-
ests that the drug threatens. Profound egalitarian and even liber-
tarian problems infect the various distribution alternatives.
Market solutions are particularly questionable. Financing Ge-
nos through loans is both impractical and offensive. Pregnancy en-
tails certain risks. To obtain a Genos loan, would the mother have
to undergo tests prescribed by the lender? Would the agreement
carefully circumscribe the activities of the mother during preg-
nancy and of both parents and child during child rearing? Could
... See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 22
(1971). See also Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. &
Econ. 211 (1976) (setting forth an economic model of regulatory agency "capture"); Richard
A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 335 (1974) (dis-
cussing and criticizing the "capture" theory of regulation); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
2" Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Choices at 101-02 (cited in note 248). Congress could
subsidize the cost of Genos to lower income groups.
262 Price, or some combination between price and time, could serve as differentiating
factors. Id. at 92-95. An example of such a combination would be waiting one's turn in line
when price is set well below the market rate. Beyond a certain minimal level, governmental
determination of "fit" Genos parents should be viewed with suspicion.
2" The Chief Justice's plurality opinion in Fullilove exhibited a willingness to defer to
Congress's selection of affirmative action as a means of enforcing the equal protection guar-
antee. 448 U.S. at 472.
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the parents obligate the child to pay off the loan? On one level,
Genos loans would transform Genos people into slaves or capital
assets. These questions illustrate the extent to which Genos recasts
human beings into products.
Further, it is unlikely that the free market will be able to sort
out "good" Genos investments from "bad" and thereby make the'
drug available to the poor through loans. It is unlikely that many
lenders will be willing to take the risks involved in making loans to
poor parents for the use of an untested technique to improve the
productivity of their offspring. Even if there are willing lenders,
they may believe that the easiest way for them to tell a "good"
Genos risk from a "bad" one is by evidence of the parents' prior
social and economic success.
Private producers might be required to vary prices according
to wealth. But this also poses problems. The supposedly wealth-
neutral market will still discriminate in favor of more wealthy indi-
viduals within each designated category. Moreover, differential
subsidies will spark bitter debate about who receives the greater
subsidy.
To cure problems of wealth-related distributions, the govern-
ment might itself allocate Genos using standards other than
wealth; however, the choice and application of these other stan-
dards are problematic. For example, the government could dis-
tribute the drug to particularly intelligent parents. But intelligence
is difficult to define, is significantly influenced by heredity,6 7 and
arguably is as arbitrary a standard as wealth. 8 It may be impossi-
ble for the government to find any distribution criteria "which are
both lucid and inoffensive to our egalitarian beliefs."2 6 A lottery
would be more neutral; but even this would be inegalitarian if
some people-perhaps those lacking certain physical and mental
capabilities-were excluded from the drawing. On the other hand,
if the lottery were open to all, potential parents who would do well
in a screening process might object to competing for the drug
against parents they consider "unfit"; they would argue, in short,
that "equality" does not always require like treatment of unlike
cases. Any scheme of government distribution of Genos will create
217 See note 10 above.
248 See Shapiro, 48 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 336, 342 (cited in note 10).
2,' Calabresi and Bobbitt note the difficulty in designating acceptable distributional
criteria. Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Choices at 109 (cited in note 248). Applying such
standards will also necessitate expensive, individualized determinations. Id. at 36. Moreover,
such personal determinations can exact steep emotional costs from the individual applicants
and the entire society. Id. at 37-38, 55-61.
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additional problems. Citizens may object to having their tax dol-
lars spent on the drug or on the particular distribution scheme
used. Moreover, any distribution scheme can break down through
black markets. 27 0 Thus, an outright ban may be the only realistic
means of eliminating the threat that Genos poses to egalitarian
values.
More importantly, a ban is the only means of eliminating the
threat that Genos poses to egalitarian values: even if a "fair" dis-
tribution of Genos were possible, the use of the drug still would
sharply divide society into Genos and non-Genos classes. To dis-
cuss Genos as though wealth differentiation were the only stum-
bling block is to misperceive the problem. The very existence of
such a caste-based social system violates the spirit, if not the let-
ter, of the equal protection clause, as well as that of the thirteenth
amendment and the nobility clauses.271 This problem inheres even
if every potential citizen has a "fair" chance of being a member of
the higher caste.27 2
II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COLLISION
A. Libertarian and Egalitarian Paradigms: Nozick and Ackerman
The tension that persists between the demands of liberty and
equality might stem from ambiguities or limitations in American
constitutional theory. Within their respective constitutional
spheres, both legislatures and courts can look to moral theory to
overcome these limits and formulate legal principle.273
270 Id. at 122.
271 See above at notes 178-79 and accompanying text (nobility clauses), 180-86 and ac-
companying text (thirteenth amendment), and 196-211, 221-35, 253-61 and accompanying
text (equal protection clause).
2 Even if Genos can be produced at a lesser price and on a larger scale, egalitarian
concerns will not be eliminated; they may even be exacerbated. More people will be able to
use the drug if it is less expensive, but even though it is free, some may choose not to use it.
The position of those few who cannot afford Genos even at a lower price (or those who
choose not to use Genos even though they can afford it) will be that of a tremendously
disadvantaged discrete and insular minority. The smaller their number, the worse their
plight. Thus, wider distribution of Genos through the market-even if Genos people became
an overwhelming majority of the population-would not eliminate egalitarian concerns with
the drug.
Perhaps even more dangerous than immediate egalitarian problems are the long-term
health risks entailed by committing a substantial part-perhaps even the majority-of an
entire generation to a new genetic mold about which science knows comparatively little.
Even if no harmful side effects have yet appeared, society cannot be sure that none will
appear years or generations hence.
217 Examining the precise role of moral principle in judicial decision making travels
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1. Does the Libertarian Paradigm of Robert Nozick Justify
Positive Genetic Engineering?
a.) What guidance is found in the values of autonomy, free
will, and transcendence?
LIBERTAS: Robert Nozick has eloquently articulated the
philosophical underpinnings for the libertarian perspective that
would protect Genos. He suggests two justifications for the asser-
tion of individual liberties against the power of the state. The first
is the basic human right, founded on free will and constitutive of
human dignity, to actualize one's potential. Closely related, the
second is the ability to pursue transcendent truth unencumbered
by state impediments. Both of these rationales sustain the produc-
tion of Genos.
Nozick's concept of individual liberty is broad-ranging and
rigid: "Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or
group of persons may do to them (without violating their rights).
So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the
question of what, if anything, the state. . . may do. '274 The predi-
cate for the "minimal state ' 275 that Nozick embraces is his vision
of self-actualization nurtured by libertarian values.2 76 State-pro-
tected individual autonomy sustains the free will that is central to
human dignity and value.2 7 Free will is good not only because it
advances the specific value of human dignity, but also because it
creates value in a more general sense. Human beings can contrib-
ute to value merely by being passive channels for its realization.
They can, however, originate value only by an act of free will.
When a person originates value, he both engenders greater value
for all society and renders himself more valuable. 278 In Nozick's
vision, organisms rank themselves by their relative degree of "or-
ganic unity"-that is, how many diverse elements these organisms
can discover and comprehend.27  He postulates a sliding scale in
well beyond the scope of this dialogue. For several good discussions of that role, see John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 43-72 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
82-88 (1977); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 55-56, 86-88 (1961).
274 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at ix (cited in note 105).
' Id.
27 This vision synthesizes seemingly contrary notions of objective morality and auton-
omy. If objective morality truly exists, it would seem to bind people to it. Nozick, Philo-
sophical Explanations at 354 (cited in note 103).
277 "Without free will, we seem diminished, merely the playthings of external forces.
How, then can we maintain an exalted view of ourselves? Determinism seems to undercut
human dignity ... [and] undermine our value." Id. at 291.
278 Id. at 519-20.
279 Id. at 412-17. "The components of value are diversity and unity. A short hand defi-
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declining order from people to animals to plants to rocks. In this
scheme he admits that the value of superintelligent, extraterres-
trial beings would exceed the value of humans. 280
Nozick believes that the superior position of superior beings is
deserved. People who are harmoniously ordered beings will inspire
everyone. 28 1 They also may discover transcendent truths that ex-
pand the horizons of the human adventure.28 2 Moreover, because
developed people will probably "come to treasure all beings, [they
will want] to aid them along a similar path of development to the
extent this is possible. ' 28 3 Lesser beings need not feel lower self-
esteem because of the superiority of others; they should not mea-
sure their self-worth by comparison with more developed people.
Nozick sees no justification for impeding self-actualization and
the resulting pursuit of transcendent truth. This pursuit is perhaps
the most personal and important endeavor in which one can en-
gage. To subjugate it to countervailing egalitarian claims28 4 is to
degrade persons by treating them as means rather than ends-in
violation of the Kantian categorical imperative:285
To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and
take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his
is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing
good from his sacrifice and no one is entitled to force this
upon him-least of all a state or government that claims his
allegiance (as. other individuals do not) and that therefore
must be neutral between its citizens. 88
These rationales of free will, self-actualization, and pursuit of tran-
scendent meaning powerfully buttress acceptance of Genos.28 ,
AEQUUS: Nozick virtually ignores problems of equality in
enlisting the minimal state in the protection of the inviolability of
nition is 'organic unity': The more diverse the material that gets unified (to a certain degree)
the greater the value." Id. at 416.
280 Id. at 417.
281 Id. at 410, 436-40.
282 Id. at 618.
283 Id. at 512.
284 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 235 (cited in note 105).
185 Nozick, Philosophical Explanations at 30-31, 32-33 (cited in note 103).
286 Id. at 33.
217 Parents who can afford Genos should not be deprived of its meaningful reproduc-
tive experience. Moreover, parental interests in leaving traces through their offspring should
be recognized. Id. at 582-83. Although Nozick does not specifically address the Genos prob-
lem, he does endorse genetic engineering and would have the market decide how many




the person and his property.2 18 Not only does his libertarian theory
vindicate economic inequality, but it also justifies inequality of
moral worth 289 that in turn justifies different treatment.290 As a re-
sult, Nozick's adulation of intellectual development leads to unat-
tractive conclusions. Indeed, his theory could even justify certain
forms of slavery, if such slavery would advance the search for the
perfection of the few. Slavery would be permissible to Nozick if it
resulted from freely made transactions.291
Ultimately, Nozick predicates his theories on the admittedly
appealing notions of free will and transcendent being. While free
will is an important value, it must be constrained by the counter-
vailing claims of others to their freedom and dignity. At some
point, denials of equal dignity that subjugate or belittle some
human beings for the sake of others in fact violate any realistic
notion of liberty. We escape the state of nature and grow civilized
only to the extent that we recognize the essential dignity of every-
one.2 9 2 Dignity does not emanate from the free will to starve23 or
to be genetically inferior in the way that Nozick himself maintains
measures human worth. Moreover, the search for transcendent
meaning is an elusive pursuit in which the value of certain forms of
intelligence is controversial.294 In this regard, Genos may be offen-
sive to many people's deeply held beliefs, in particular to certain
religious traditions if it does not conform to what they perceive as
288 Id. at ix, 270. Indeed, Nozick even suggests that taxation of wages is on par with
"forced labor." Id. at 169.
" See text at notes 281-86 above.
"89 "It may be that at a certain level of someone's development, others ought to treat
him in certain ways, yet at a higher level of his development others no longer ought to do so,
for their previous behavior could no longer be responsive to his (now) most valuable charac-
teristics." Nozick, Philosophical Explanations at 504. Nozick also says that a superior per-
son cannot demand superior rights, but only that one must change one's behavior toward a
superior person in order to be responsive to his identity. Id. at 504.
"I See generally Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 325-26 (cited in note 8). Nozick tries to
evade this problem by claiming that developed persons will not enslave others because they
will treasure all people and all things. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations at 511-12.
2 Men are, in great measure, what they feel themselves to be, and they think of them-
selves as they are thought of by their fellows. The advance in individual self-respect
and in social amenity caused by the softening of the more barbarous inequalities of the
past is the contribution to civilization as genuine a3 the improvement in material
condition.
R. H. Tawney, Equality 171 (1964), quoted in Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 348 n.7
(cited in note 105).
M Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 573-74 (cited in note 181).
" For example, see Calabresi and Bobbitt, Tragic Choices at 70 (cited in note 248)
(admonishing that logic can be a destructive force).
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divinely ordained rules. s5
b.) Can Nozick justify inequalities in the distribution of
resources?
LIBERTAS: To the extent that the ethic of liberty itself
confines choices, it does so far less than other ethics. Moreover,
one need not embrace all of Nozick's libertarian philosophy to pro-
tect Genos. The drug implicates very personal decisions about pro-
creation and genetic composition. One might allow widespread eco-
nomic regulation without countenancing intrusions into this more
personal sphere. s6 While the precise contours of this guarantee of
personal liberty may be difficult to define, the guarantee must en-
compass parents' control over their offspring's genetic makeup. Fi-
nally, Nozick's theory provides an answer to the problem of differ-
entiation based on wealth: assuming an equal initial distribution of
wealth, subsequent inequalities are justified so long as they result
from freely made transfers.29 7 Although Genos may increase ine-
quality in wealth, it does so through free transfers.
AEQUUS: Ronald Dworkin has remarked that Nozick's
"starting gate theory" "makes sense in games such as Monopoly,
whose point is to allow luck and skill to play a highly circum-
scribed and, in the last analysis, arbitrary role. '298 Not only do
they exhibit a sense of arbitrariness, but an initial equal distribu-
tion of resources and subsequent freely-made transfers are
counterintuitive and, in any event, hard to verify empirically.299
29 See Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man, especially 129-51 (1970); Ted Howard and Jer-
emy Rifkin, Who Should Play God? (1977). In a letter to the President concerning the pros-
pect of positive genetic engineering, three religious leaders admonished "[t]hose who would
play God." Letter from Dr. Claire Randall (Nat'l Council of Churches), Rabbi Bernard
Mandelbaum (Gen. Sec'y, Synagogue Council of America), and Bishop Thomas Kelly
(United States Catholic Conf.), to the President of the United States (June 20, 1980), re-
printed in President's Commission at 95-96 (cited in note 10).
298 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 574, 889-93 (cited in note 181). Tribe
maintains that one might allow regulation of the free market such as that struck down dur-
ing the Lochner era and at the same time have broad protection of personal and economic
liberty. For him, the error of Lochner was not that it protected economic liberty but that it
denigrated true economic liberty by rigidly protecting the free market. Id. at 919, 949.
I" Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 150-60 (cited in note 105). Nozick says that
any distribution resulting from past injustices may be rectified by governmental redistribu-
tion. Id. at 152-53 & n.*. Indeed, he says that any pattern that does not result from these
individual choices can be overturned by these choices. Id. at 164.
118 Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. & Pub.
Affairs 284, 310 (1981).
299 Nozick specifically countenances government intervention to rectify transfers in-
fected with such coercion. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 152. To the extent that




Further, Genos will only exacerbate arbitrary inequalities. The
drug increases the dependence of personal liberty on economic re-
sources. Insofar as Genos people will be superior resource genera-
tors, they will also be a living form of unfair competition.
2. Does the Egalitarian Paradigm of Bruce Ackerman Legit-
imate Restraints on Positive Genetic Engineering?
AEQUUS: To buttress a theory of equality that does not
denigrate liberty, Bruce Ackerman has formulated the neutrality
principle. As his starting point, he postulates the equal worth of
every individual. Equal worth requires that any departure from
equality of resources be predicated on what Ackerman calls a
"neutral justification." That is, to sustain a claim to unequal re-
sources, one cannot assert: "(a) that his conception of the good is
better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens, or (b) that,
regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior
to one or more of his fellow citizens."300 On the basis of this theory,
Ackerman rejects the creation of any people who could dominate
others genetically, because such people could claim inherent
superiority.301
LIBERTAS: Ackerman's position exemplifies the problems
with egalitarianism. First, he assumes that competition for re-
sources is a zero-sum game, that is, that competition is for a finite
set of resources. This simply ignores the basic insight of capitalism:
that all will gain from free enterprise.302 Second, achieving equality
of resources is bound to necessitate extensive coercive redistribu-
tion: for left alone, free exchanges tend to generate substantial ine-
quality.303 Ackerman's theories represent an extreme version of the
Aristotelian concept of equality: "things that are alike should be
treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated
unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 31 04 This concept is inde-
terminate unless one defines the categories of morally "alike" and
"unalike" objects. 30 5 In applying this standard of equality, Acker-
300 Ackerman, Social Justice at 11 (cited in note 69).
, Id. at 119-25, 133.
302 Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 1981 Amer. Bar Found. Research J. 231, 236. See
also the "tale of two pies" told by Richard Epstein in Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain 3-6 (1985).
303 Posner, 1981 Amer. Bar Found. Research J. at 240-41. Posner argues that the mere
assertion of relative goodness hardly comprises a rational basis for receiving an equal share
of unequally-distributed goods: under Ackerman's framework, the absence of a rational jus-
tification is a neutral reason to deny a claim of equal rights. Id. at 238-39.
304 Westen, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 544-45 (cited in note 188), discussing Aristotle, 3 Ethica
Nichomachea 1131a-1131b (W. Ross trans. 1925).
306 Westen, 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 544-45 (cited in note 188).
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man simply defines all human beings as "alike" and thus advocates
a draconian state-enforced reordering of societal resources in order
to equalize the positions of all human beings. The logic of this po-
sition could encompass a claim that government should actively
manipulate inherited genetic traits to equalize natural abilities.306
From Ackerman's pure egalitarian perspective, Utopia might be a
society of clones,
The deepest problems with Ackerman's neutrality principle lie
in its assault on societal support for the search for absolute truth
and transcendent meaning. If someone can show that her system
more closely approximates truth, goodness, or transcendent mean-
ing, Ackerman would not allow her to claim additional societal re-
sources to pursue it 07
B. The Ambivalent Rawlsian Synthesis
1. Does the Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity
Proscribe Technologically Inducing Genetic Superiority?
AEQUUS: The intricate philosophical edifice that John
Rawls fashioned in A Theory of Justice argues for control of Ge-
nos. Rawls's theory moves to counteract "the accidents of natural
endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance as coun-
ters in quest for political and economic advantage." 308 To mitigate
arbitrary inequalities, Rawls seeks to determine how the citizens of
a given society would structure the commonwealth if they were ig-
norant of their individual wealth, abilities, and other resources. 0
He concludes that they would follow two sets of principles. The
first set affords all members of society certain basic liberties: "the
30 If, for example, a hypothetical drug like Genos could be used to correct the deficien-
cies of the mentally retarded, giving them normal intelligence, Ackerman's equality would
seem to dictate its use. Suppose, however, that the use of this hypothetical drug on anyone,
including the retarded, would render them nothing less than geniuses. What would Acker-
man's equality command in that case?
:07 Consider Posner, 1981 Amer. Bar Found. Research J. at 236-39 (cited in note 302).
0o Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 15 (cited in note 8). Rawls does not contend that the
distribution of these abilities is just or unjust. Rather, he claims that this distribution is
undeserved. Id. at 103-04. He assumes that the allocation of these abilities is not under
direct societal control. Id. at 62. Genos, of course, negates this assumption. Among the natu-
ral abilities listed by Rawls are vigor and intelligence. Id. These are precisely the abilities
that Genos, by assumption, augments.
311 Id. at 16-19. This is Rawls's celebrated "veil of ignorance." It invests his theory with
a certain universality because it enables people rationally to choose the society in which
they would live without reference to selfish interests dictated by their preexisting societal
position. Rawis further argues that, in response to uncertainty, individuals choose according
to the "maximin rule": that is, they prefer the least bad outcome among the worst possible
outcomes. Id. at 152-53.
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right to vote and to be eligible for public office; .. .freedom of
speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought;
freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) prop-
erty; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizures defined by the
concept of the rule of law."3 10 Because they emanate from the nat-
ural rights of each individual, these rights of "equal liberty"' s" can-
not be abridged for the welfare of the rest of society. 2
Rawls's second set of principles-subordinate to the
first313-concerns the distribution of resources other than personal
liberty. Although these principles do not require an equal distribu-
tion of income or wealth, they do restrict inequalities of both in
certain respects:3 14 "Social and economic inequalities are to be ar-
ranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged,. . . and (b) attached to offices and positions open to
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 3 15 The first
part of this second set of principles protects the economically least
advantaged s 6 and is termed the "difference principle";317 the sec-
ond part is the principle of "fair equality of opportunity"318 or
"fair opportunity."31 9 Just as the principle of liberty cannot be vio-
lated to advance either of these distributional concerns, the princi-
ple of fair opportunity cannot be abridged to accommodate the dif-
ference principle. 20
Equality of opportunity demands that "positions of authority
and offices of command must be accessible to all. 3 21 By producing
310 Id. at 61. Rawls's final formulation of his first principle requires that "[e]ach person
is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compati-
ble with a similar system of liberty for all." Id. at 302.
31 Id. at 204.
312 Id. at 28.
33 The first principle has absolute priority and cannot be overcome by utilitarian con-
siderations. Rawls allows personal liberty to be restricted only in two narrow cases: "(a) a
less extensive liberty must strengthen the total. . . liberty shared by all; [or] (b) a less than
equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty." Id. at 302.
14 Id. at 61.
315 Id. at 302. The second principle even ensures inter-generational equality of oppor-
tunity by incorporating a "just savings principle" that requires that the present generation
save adequately for the future. Id. at 284-93.
31 Although the precise definition of "least advantaged" is not critical to the theory,
Rawls suggests that the term "least advantaged" might include those with less than one-half
of the median income or those in "lower" occupational classes such as unskilled workers. Id.
at 98.
317 Id. at 78.
31 Id. at 83.
31 Id. at 303.
3,0 See id. at 302-03.
311 Id. at 61.
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such great inequalities in talent-inequalities ultimately tied to
wealth-Genos will abridge equality of opportunity without ad-
vancing any cognizable interest in liberty as Rawls has defined
it. 322 Consequently, Rawls's reconciliation of the tensions between
liberty and equality323 requires that Genos be controlled.
2. Does the Difference Principle Favor Positive Genetic
Engineering?
LIBERTAS: The poor-may be helped without placing con-
trols on Genos. Rawls himself acknowledges the tension that hu-
mankind's growing ability to improve individual potential poses for
his theory, in particular for the difference principle. Positive ge-
netic engineering is just such a development. Recognizing that so-
ciety can affect the distribution of natural talents, he says that "[a]
caste system, for example, tends to divide society into separate bi-
ological populations, while an open society encourages the widest
genetic diversity. 3 25 While the abhorrence of a caste system re-
flects egalitarian concerns, the ideal of an "open society" reflects
libertarian values. The question in Rawlsian terms therefore is:
Does Genos create a caste system or does it advance diversity in an
open society?
Genos does not create a caste system. While the drug aug-
ments the opportunities of some, it does not segregate society into
separate populations. Constitutional rights for all will remain. So
will the free enterprise system, which guarantees opportunities for
all. The status of Genos people is not preordained: to gain success,
they must produce. Spurring production underwrites the difference
principle. Rawls himself advocates that people with superior abili-
ties be considered "a social asset to be used for the common ad-
vantage. 3 21 Whether or not Genos people strive to help the least
advantaged, the increased wealth, technology, and cultural
achievement they generate will benefit everyone. Should none of
the wealth benefit the least advantaged, progressive taxation and
other redistributive policies can, as Rawls notes, ensure their pros-
322 Applied to American constitutional theory, Rawls's conception of "liberty" would
approximate the explicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights; it does not seem to encompass
substantive due process. See text at notes 310-12 above.
323 Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 204 (cited in note 8).
324 The tension in Rawlsian theory occurs even under his very narrow conception of
liberty, see text at notes 313-23 above, which does not appear to include childbearing and
child rearing interests.




perity 27 While Rawls is ambivalent about how persons of superior
ability might affect the chance for others to pursue their life
plans,328 this need not be a problem in a growing economy: the dis-
coveries spurred by Genos will broadly expand all people's oppor-
tunities. Because Genos can make all people better off, the poor
will be better off with it than without it: the difference principle
therefore allows production of the drug.
Finally, Rawls might object to Genos on grounds of fair oppor-
tunity in the political arena. Admittedly, the superior intelligence
of Genos people may secure for them a disproportionate voice in
governance.32 9 This problem, however, exposes another tension in
Rawlsian theory. Rawls espouses broadly based, democratic rule,33 0
but broadly based rule does not guarantee that the principles of
justice will be applied correctly. The superior abilities of Genos
people may well sharpen the application of Rawls's own principles.
3. Does the Value of Self-Respect Disfavor Extreme Genetic
Inferiority?
AEQUUS: Wealth is not the only important value for
Rawls. 31 Individual and aggregate well-being are functions not
only of wealth, but of self-respect and a sense that the world is just
and fair. Maximizing wealth within the confines of the difference
principle cannot easily be dismissed as undesirable. To do so takes
lightly the possibility of improving the position of the least ad-
vantaged. The dilemma posed by Genos may be stated as follows:
Should society increase the standard of living for the poor at the
expense of forever relegating non-Genos people to inferior status,
or should it ignore the vital need for additional resources to sal-
vage equality of opportunity?
As formulated, the quandary is predicated on the supposition
that some of the extra resources produced by Genos will be redis-
:27 Id. at 278.
18 Id. at 107. Rational people will respond with gratitude and affection to the strides
that Genos people will have made for them. Id. at 494-95.
"I See text following note 203 above.
330 Rawls maintains that in an ideal state representation should encompass all commu-
nities of interest and should be drawn "equally from all sectors of society." A Theory of
Justice at 228.
3" It is a mistake to believe that a just and good society must wait upon a high material
standard of life. What men will want is meaningful work and free association with
others, these associations regulating their relations to one another within a framework
of just basic institutions. To achieve this state of things great wealth is not necessary.
In fact, beyond some point, it is likely to be a positive hindrance, a meaningless dis-
traction at best if not a temptation to indulgence and emptiness.
Id. at 290.
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tributed to the poor. It is far from clear that redistribution will
occur. Aldous Huxley's Brave New World contains no difference
principle.3 3 2 The human psyche has a frightening tendency to seg-
regate and subjugate. Genos supplies novel and disquieting suste-
nance for this tendency: it undergirds the claim of superiority upon
which a claim to domination may be predicated.3 3
Rawls recognizes that his difference principle could exacerbate
economic inequality if small amounts of benefit to the least ad-
vantaged could legitimate large increases in wealth for the best
off.3 34 To avert this difficulty, he mandates redistributive institu-
tions of government.33 5 Moreover, he claims that the structure of
the just society will itself tend to soften inequality; the difference
principle and market forces will broaden opportunities for educa-
tion and training.336 Still, Rawls's solutions may not be sufficient to
remedy the inequality that Genos will cause. Education alone can-
not easily rectify the differences in ability that Genos engenders.
Even if redistribution does occur, it may benefit groups other than
the least advantaged.37
In his calculus of the difference principle, Rawls includes in
his measure of benefits other resources besides income and mate-
rial possessions. These are "rights and liberties, opportunities and
powers."338 A final and perhaps paramount value is self-respect.
Self-respect involves thinking that one's life plan has worth and
having confidence that one can carry it out.3 3 9 Self-respect is fun-
damentally supported by fair opportunity. Non-Genos people will
continually witness and compare themselves unfavorably to the su-
perior abilities and accomplishments of Genos people. 40 That
those abilities and accomplishments ultimately derive from
332 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932). Nor does a difference principle appear in
George Orwell's Animal Farm (1946) or Nineteen Eighty-Four (1948).
313 See text accompanying notes 293-94 above.
14 Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 157-58.
-"5 Id. at 277-80.
116 Frequently, training and education will mitigate disadvantages in natural ability by
increasing the supply of qualified persons and reducing disparities in pay. Id. at 307.
337 Nozick claims that political incentives prompt more redistribution to the middle
class than to the poor. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 274-75 (cited in note 105).
338 Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 92.
339 Id. at 440. Applying the difference principle, one might argue that Genos will aug-
ment all of these primary goods, including self-respect, for the least advantaged. Even if this
were true, the principle of fair opportunity for all is prior to, and consequently constrains,
the difference principle. See text accompanying note 320 above.
3'0 Rawls claims that "given our [life plan], we tend to be ashamed of those defects in
our person and failures in our actions that indicate a loss or absence of the excellences
essential to carrying out our more important associative aims." A Theory of Justice at 444.
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wealth-rather than effort or hereditary luck-may rankle and em-
bitter. Rawls cautions that such emotions can catalyze societal in-
stability. 41 Although he endorses "intelligence and imagination,
strength and endurance," he ultimately concludes:
[U]nless intellect and vigor are regulated by a sense of justice
and obligation, they may only enhance one's capacity to over-
ride the legitimate claims of others. Certainly it would not be
rational to want some to be so superior in these respects that
just institutions would be jeopardized. 42
CONCLUSION
The dialogue ends here. This is not because the issues are re-
solved or because one side has triumphed in the argument-that
will likely never occur-but because it must end at some point.
These philosophical speculations may have little effect on the de-
velopment of genetic engineering: for better or worse, decisions
with the most far-reaching social consequences frequently are
made not in open discussion, but in guarded seclusion. 43 Some-
times, decisions are even made unconsciously, as scientific develop-
ments carry people along with them. 4
To some commentators, the march toward positive genetic en-
gineering is inexorable. Genetic knowledge accumulates quickly
from such wide-ranging sources as cancer research, botanical appli-
cations, and animal husbandry. 43 Casting a regulatory net dis-
cretely so as not to curb beneficial work such as cancer research 4 6
341 "The most stable conception of justice. . . is presumably one that is perspicuous to
our reasoning, congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in affirmation of
the self." Id. at 499.
342 Id. at 436-37.
343 Often, important societal decisions are not made by government at all, but by per-
sons outside of government. Green, 48 Ind. L. J. at 578 (cited in note 135) ("The decisions
to proceed... are made by small elite groups and are submitted to Congress, for ratifica-
tion in the appropriations process, without exposition of the basic long-term policy issues.").
This decision-making process excludes the voices of nearly all citizens. But see Singer, 3
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. at 320 (cited in note 46) ("The more serious dangers of scientific igno-
rance, however, occur when choices are made at the societal level. At this level, even a single
individual can manipulate scientific ignorance and consequent fears into support for irra-
tional, almost primitive myths."). The public may oppose science tampering with the crea-
tion of life. Hearings at 181-82 (cited in note 38); Walsh, Public Attitude Toward Science is
Yes-But, 215 Science 270 (1982), cited in President's Commission at 29 (cited in note 10).
14 Green, 48 Ind. L. J. at 574 (cited in note 135).
345 Id.
346 As another example, if a pregnant woman is dying, would society deny her the right
to use new technology to have her fetus transplanted into another's womb so that it might
survive? Surely not- yet the technology acquired from refining such widely accepted applica-
1986] 1339
The University of Chicago Law Review
will be a delicate task. Some of the genetic advances made in cur-
ing disease and other areas will augment knowledge with which to
achieve positive genetic engineering. The line between positive and
negative genetic engineering is perhaps too elusive for the law to
pin down for regulation. Moreover, the legal process may well be
unable to cope with these problems with sufficient speed.3 "7 The
judiciary fashions principles slowly and retrospectively. The legis-
lature, constrained by time, usually tends to the obvious, pressing,
and immediate, leaving less concrete concerns for another day. Re-
straining an area about which we know little risks stifling pro-
gress, 48 yet waiting to regulate until genetically engineered
humans exist is unrealistic. After experimental, genetically engi-
neered people exist, it may take a long time and many specimens
before we understand their full capabilities and implications. 49
Once many such people are around, society may not dare to con-
sider the wrenching alternative of telling them that it does not
want them. Indeed, the dialogue does not examine whether Genos
will affect the germ line so that experimental Genos people could
reproduce. Under these circumstances, the options for eliminating
the Genos race might be quite repulsive.
Even curbing preliminary research into genetic engineering in-
volves potential first and fourteenth amendment difficulties, 350 al-
though whatever constitutional right to scientific research may ex-
tions can service more ambiguous enterprises. Gorney, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 281 (cited in
note 37).
147 Senator Gore has cautioned that "genetic technology is advancing so rapidly that it
may surpass the ability of our existing institutions to control it." Gore and Owens, 3 Yale L.
& Pol'y Rev. at 338 (cited in note 29).
' Green, 48 Ind. L. J. at 574 (cited in note 135).
'" Before a certain stage, scientific development is not sufficiently concrete to frame
legislation. Frank P. Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology: Limits and Possibili-
ties, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 480, 481 (1968). It is, for example, important to the formulation of
regulatory strategy to identify the line of technological development that ultimately suc-
ceeds. Id. at 483-84.
350 John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51
So. Cal. L. Rev. 1203, 1251 (1978). Robertson considers the freedom to research critically
linked with the freedom to speak, think, and publish. He would place constitutional protec-
tion for research under the same degree of protection as freedom to publish: as a prerequi-
site to regulation, he would require "a high probability" that publication would lead to
harm. Id. at 1251. Under this test, government would have difficulty preempting research,
since research results are unpredictable and often are not fully understood at first. See also
Ira A. Carmen, Cloning and the Constitution (1985) (combining speech and procreation au-
tonomy rights to impose particularly strict protections for fetal genetic research). But see
Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 Pa. L. Rev.
1403, 1412-17 (1983) (arguing that even pure scientific experimentation is subject to regula-
tion because it is action rather than speech).
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ist surely has limits. 51 Congress has other alternatives to slow
genetic advances: it might circumscribe public funding vital to ge-
netic research or forbid patents on certain products of genetic re-
search, a move that could seriously slow privately funded genetic
endeavors. 52 In addition, Congress probably could force publica-
tion of technological processes if it provided advance notice to
avoid violating industry expectations.353 If business could not pro-
tect its formulas, it could not profit from genetic research. To date,
however, regulation of genetic research in the United States has
been confined largely to containment of risks to health and
safety.3 54 Only intermittently have the executive and legislative
branches glimpsed the larger philosophical issues 55 Against this
narrowly focused regulatory backdrop, genetic research is
burgeoning.3 56
Whatever one thinks of these developments, they should not
be permitted to occur by default of the body politic. The question
"' See Robertson, 51 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 1278 (cited in note 350); James R. Ferguson,
Scientific and Technical Expression: A Problem in First Amendment Theory, 16 Harv. Civ.
Rts.-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 519, 553 (1981); John B. Attanasio, Science and the Constitution, 48
Rev. of Pol. 476, 479-81 (1985) (suggesting four first amendment approaches to regulating
scientific research), reviewing Carmen, Cloning and the Constitution (cited in note 350) .
3" In Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303, the Court allowed genetically engineered bacteria
to be patented, liberally construing the statute. Id. at 316. Thus, Congress would have to
amend the patent laws in order to disallow the commercial protection of these products.
3 If the federal government does not explicitly guarantee a trade secret, government-
compelled disclosure does not constitute a taking in "an industry that long has been the
focus of great public concern and significant government regulation." Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984),
15' Although it reaches some private activities, most federal regulation of pure genetic
research focuses on federally funded projects. See generally Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986). The federal government's current
view is that "[a]ny approach to implementing guidelines should not impede future develop-
ments in rDNA technology." Id. at 23,308. See also Carmen, Cloning (cited in note 350)
(historical and empirical perspective on genetic research); Judith Areen, Regulating Human
Gene Therapy, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 153 (1985) (focusing on federal regulation of human ge-
netic research); John E. Barkstrom, Recombinant DNA and the Regulation of Biotechnol-
ogy: Reflections on the Asilomar Conference, Ten Years Later, 19 Akron L. Rev. 81 (1985)
(asserting that even safety regulations are lax); Marvin M. Quigley and Lori B. Andrews,
Human In Vitro Fertilization, 42 Fertility & Sterility 348 (1984) (outlining state regulations
on fetal research); Robertson, 59 So. Cal. L. Rev. at 977 & n.124 (cited in note 34) (states
may not be strictly enforcing their bans on fetal research).
:55 For examples of the executive and Congress grappling with the larger ethical ques-
tions of human genetic engineering, see Hearings (cited in note 38); President's Commission
(cited in note 10); Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee meeting, 49 Fed. Reg. 699
(1984). The government has also resisted funding human gene therapy that might affect the
germ line. Recombinant DNA Research, Actions Under Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 9760
(1985).
3"' See Lappe, Broken Code at 6 (cited in note 52). Osterfund, Christian Science Moni-
tor, Jan. 14, 1985, at 14, col. 1 (cited in note 28).
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is too important to accept passively whatever develops. To choose
actively and well, it is important to evaluate the impact of positive
genetic engineering on ourselves and our posterity. Because the
question defies a strictly rational solution, evaluating it is also val-
uable in that it exposes the libertarian or egalitarian inclinations
within each of us. My own bias is egalitarian. Nonetheless, I cannot
claim to have resolved the tension created by potential genetic.
research.
The Genos projection only initiates the necessary dialogue. I
hope that it clarifies thinking about constitutionally permissible
ends and means. Application of this analysis to incremental scien-
tific advances remains. Even for one who believes as I do that
something specifically like Genos can and should be banned, indi-
vidual genetic breakthroughs must be examined on their own mer-
its. In grappling with these perplexing questions, we may learn less
about Genos people than about ourselves.
